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7 FOREWORD 
I.  The new global economy in order to realize all its virtualities implies the setting up 
of a harmonized set of competition rules and the scrapping of  all  barriers impeding 
the access to third markets.  This is particularly true for the information technology 
and communications industry  which represents the core of the emergence of the 
information society and for  the United States and Japan which represent the two 
biggest economic powers both in general terms and as far as the ITC industry  is 
concerned. 
Change is accelerating both in Japan and in the US.  However, this change tends to 
take place within their respective markets rather than in their outside relations.  1 'he 
ensuing tendency of creating  more competitive markets  and  industry  creates  an 
additional threat to the competitiveness of  the Community industry.  There is on the 
other hand a danger that the Community industry benefit comparatively less than 
its Japanese and US competitors from the global economy. 
II.  An open and fair world economy is an essential complement to the completion of 
the  internal  market  in  order  to  foster  the  competitiveness  of the  Community 
industry.  In the Communication of  the Commission [Sec (91) 565 final- April 3th. 
1991]  it  was  suggested  in  particular  to  sustain  a  competitive  Community 
electronics and  IT industry  by  improving the access  to  the  markets of the  maiiL 
trading partners in electronics and IT and by the establishment of fair competition 
in international markets. 
The Council Resolution of 18 November 1991  concerning electronics, information 
and  communication  technology  has  retained  this  approach  by  mandating  the 
Commission  to  establish  a  Centralized  Point  of  Information,  charged  with 
monitoring marketing, market access and distribution practices throughout the main 
industrial  areas  in  the  world  in  the  domain  of electronics,  information  and 
communication technology industry. 
The  Communication  from  the  Commission  on  "The  European 
Telecomrm~nications Equipment Industry - the  state of play,  issues  at  stake  and 
proposals for action" [Sec (92)  1049 Final - July 15th, 1992J represents a specific 
application of  this approach since it is suggested that "the search for a level playing 
field" for the telecommunications industry on the world level, could be reached by 
the use of  two means, combined or not : 
the  elimination  of those  unsatisfactory  access  conditions  which  prevail  m 
markets outside the Community; 
- the setting of  appropriate rules of  competition at world level. 
The Council's conclusions on the latter Communication has embodied this specific 
application of the global approach by stating in particular that "commercial policy 
and competition policy wilJ be instrumental in the Community's efforts towards the 
objective of a level playing field;  the Centralised Point of Infonnation providing 
supporting information and analysis to this effect." 
8 I. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES 
The  Community's  objective  is  the  furtherance  of truly  equal  conditions  of 
competition of  all economic operators, whatever their nationality, in all countries. 
1.  CONCERTED PRACTICES (JAPAN) 
1.1  Dealer Networks 
The small traditional retailers are not fmancially controlled by the manufacturers; 
however, manufacturers hold a certain power through large exclusive relationships: 
loans at low interest rates, help with accounting procedures, demonstrators at their 
disposal,  the  allocation of advertising  and  descriptive  material,  taking  back of 
unsold goods, exchange of personal services, etc., in exchange for an unchanging 
loyalty to the manufacturer's name 3.  This empowers them to control the supply of 
goods and services and conversely jmpedes foreign suppliers from distributing their 
products.  This is presently being challenged by the emergence of specialists and 
discounters. 
Cqmments 
A  fair  and open  distribution  system  is  essential  in  order  to  allow  an 
unhindered flow  of imports  and  the  competitive  determination  of the 
condition of  their sale.  Lack of  competition prevents European companies 
from selling in Japan:  concerted practices are not sufficiently discouraged 
and they keep European companies out of  the Japanese market. 
1.2  Price levels 
3 
4 
Japanese companies have been seen practicing higher retail  prices in Japan than 
overseas, which reflects the lack of competition at the price level on the Japanese 
market 4 and has an effect on the possible dumping practices. 
Japanese companies often practi~ prices lower than production prices overseas in 
order to  eliminate competitors on a given market and to establish a monopoly  5. 
The losses incurred are compensated by higher prices on the Japanese market.  This 
price difference is made possible by a network of  typical relations in Japan between 
manufacturing  companies,  banks,  users  (including  the  distribution  system)  in 
conjunction with restrictive behaviour on imports 6. 
"The Distribution of  Consumer Eleetronics in Japan" by BIS Strategic Deeisions, November 1991 • paae  I~ 
"Worldwide Priclna Study for selected IT Products" -study pre.,.cd for 00  XIII by Datlquest (June 1992). 
S  CRS Report for Conarcss "Japan's Protected Market: Sianlficance, Extent, Oudook and Challenaes for U.S. Policy"· 9 July 
1990. 
6  Paper by the  Confeder~tion of Gennan Industry on "Grievances of German Industry towards the Japanese Government llld 
Industry". 
9 The  unusual  degree  to  which  Japanese  multinational  companies  dominate  trade 
flows into and out of Japan is a trade pattern often cited as an indication of market 
protection.  Stated differently,  Japanese corporate control  over imports  limits  the 
channels for  getting foreign goods into Japan that compete directly with Japanese 
goods. 
Comments 
The  competition  rules  should  be  thoroughly  implemented  and  enforced 
without any exception as  to  the  economic sectors actually affected by the 
rulings  of the  Fair  Trade  Commission.  The  problem  is  that  the  FTC 
enforces  the  anti-trust  law  in  areas  in  which  international  trade  is  not 
concerned and which therefore bear no interest for European exporters. 
The  investigation  launched  by  the  Fair  Trade  Commission  against 
Matsushita (National Panasonic),  Sony,  Hitachi and Toshiba has opened a 
loophole in the system.  The  charge was actually not of  fixing prices but of 
imposing trade conditions and it has opened the  room to discount stores of 
consumer electronics to offer discounts of  up to 50%.  They have succeeded 
in doing this because: 
they do not purchase the products directly from the manufacturers 
but from wholesalers and retailers who want to get rid of  excessive 
inventories, i.e.  something that the normal retailers cannot do 
because of  their agreements with the manufacturers; 
they practice the jive no i.e.  no price showing, no explanations on 
the working of  the products by the salesman, no to home delivery, 
no to exchange of  products after sale, no to ajier sales service. 
Despite  these  limitations,  the  discount  stores  have  got  their  turnover 
multiplied  by  five  in  the  last  five  years.  They  have,  however,  clear 
limitations to  their growth  since  they may offer  only a  limited sample of 
products since: 
they can sell only what they get from their suppliers, and 
they have no access to manufacturers who,  in order not to 
relinquish their control on the firJal prices, steadfastly refuse to sell 
directly to them.  · 
DAEI is a big discounter aiming at the lower end of  the market, where 
volumes are huge and margins are thin i.e.  refrigerators, rice cookers, 
television sets etc and has become a big catalyst for change in Japanese 
retailing.  · 
DAEI was a pioneer in selling products under a private label at cut-rate 
prices.  It has recently forged relationships with a number of  manufacturers 
and  bi:~ trading houses.  By consolidating these mergers and thus acquiring 
10 more purchasing power, they will be able to keep reducing their cost and to 
control their pricing. 
In relevant rulings, although not directly affecting the /IT  sector, 
discounters won a round in their battle with manufacturers when the Tokyo 
District Court ordered Shiseido Co to supply a retailer that puts the 
company's cosmetics on store shelves rather than dispensing them through 
sales personnel. 
The Court ruled that the Shiseido demand  for sales people "impeded mass 
sales by retailers without a proper reason and amounted to price fixing" The 
Court said that because of  this "there is a possibility that it is violating the 
anti-monopoly law.  In September 1993 the Fair trade Commission raided 
offices of  the Shiseido units for alleged anti-trust practices involving another 
discount store.  Following these raids the Court ordered Shiseido to resume 
supplying retailers, even if  they sell by mail order and ignore the cosmestic's 
maker's quiet pressure never to undercut the suggested retail price. 
A law bringing in financial penalties for anti-competitive practices was only 
passed in 1977; these penalties are calculated on a case by case basis.  Since 
this date,  none of  the  interventions of  the  Fair  Trade  Commission  in  the 
household electronics sector have resulted in financial sanctions7.  These 
penalties  apply  in  particular  against  private  monopolisation  or 
unreasonalbe restrains/ of  trade (see Annex 1) 
2.  LACK OF EFFECTIVE COMPETITION (JAPAN) 
2.1. Dominant Position ofNTT 
7 
NIT remains  the  dominant  purchaser of equipment and  provider of services,  a 
situation likely to continue for some time.  Since its creation in  1952, NIT has 
maintained a close relationship with selected suppliers, most notably Hitachi, NEC, 
Oki and Fujitsu.  These four companies, account for more than 60% of  the Japanese 
domestic production of  Telecommunication equipment. 
To date, it is difficult to enter the Japanese switch market without tendering into a 
research contract with NIT 
It is also difficult to enter the non-NIT market for telecommunications equipment, 
because the new common carriers depend greatly on interconnection to  the NIT 
network  to  provide .  service  and  therefore  tend  to  procure  most  critical  network 
equipment from Japanese suppliers most familiar with NIT's network. 
The Ministry of Posts and  Telecommunications (MPT) is  considering a plan that 
would  end  NTT's  local  monopoly  and  see  full  voice  and  data  competition  via 
wireless. 
"The distribution of  Consumer Electronics in Japan"  by BIS Strategic Decisions -page 92 
11 Under  the  plan,  the  MPT  would  award  personal  handy-phone  service  (PHS) 
licenses  by  the  end  of 1994  to  NIT,  long  distance  carrier  DDI  Corp  and  an 
embryonic consortium of  common carriers, regional electric power utilities, railway 
companies and cable television operators. 
Comments 
a)  Numerous  specific  regulations  and  complicated  procedures  limit  a 
smooth business expansion for service providers. 
The procedures to be registered as a special type II carrier [prerequisite for 
providmg  International  Value  Added  Network  Services  (!VANS)}.  the 
cooperation  with  type  I carriers  (unavoidable  due  to  the  basic regulatory 
approach in Japan),  the  authorisation procedures for specific services,  the 
introduction of  new and innovative services,  etc.  are governed by numerous 
formal and informal regulations. 
b)  Lack of  definition of  services (basic,  enhanced) in the context of  business 
authorisation by regulatory instances. 
The  Japanese  Telecommunications Business Law distinguishes carriers not 
by the  type of  services they provide,  but according to  whether they own a 
communication infrastructure or not.  However,  the provision of  any service 
is  subject to  some form of  authorisation (as  a service,  or through  tariffs). 
The  intrinsic difficulty therefore results from the lack of  specific definition of 
services.  This  makes any long-term  business planning difficult since  each 
service case must be discussed individually with the regulatory authorities. 
c)  Lack of  separation between regulatory authority and dominant carriers. 
Formally,  the  Ministry of Post and Telecommunications  (MPT)  is  to  be  a 
neutral regulatory authority (authorisations of  services and tariffs,  etc.)  In 
practice,  MPT stabilises the current competition situation which establishes 
Kokusai  Deushin  Denwa  (KDD)  as  a  dominant player for  the  market of 
international services.  Though the regulatory and supervising function ofthe 
administration  would suggest a clear separation between MPT and KDD, 
the practice seems to  be different.  Typical examples are that MPT enquires 
with  KDD  for  technical  expertise  needed  when  defining  and  applying 
regulations  to  foreign  service providers  who  also  have  to  negotiate  with 
KDD  as for  the  access of circuits,  for tariffs.  (later formally approved by 
MPT),  etc  ..  The  relationship between MPT and KDD  is  also influenced by 
KDD as a reservoir for "retirement careers" for senior MPT staff As for the. 
few Japanese competitors of  KDD,  it is generally known that the  degree of 
competition  (e.g.  tariff differences,  foreign  share  to  be  allowed,  etc.)  is 
implicitly determined under the coordination of  MPT 
As a result,  European service providers are. in practice obliged to  negotiate 
with  their  main  competitor  (KDD)  which  often  means  the  disclosure  of 
business plans. 
12 d)  Restrictions  resulting from  bilateral !VANS agreement  between Japan 
, and Member States,  usage of  the US/Japan !VANS agreement as reference. 
The  Japanese  authorities state  that  the  !VANS agreements are  needed to 
accommodate the differences in regulatory environments between Japan and 
third countries and have  consequently concluded !VANS agreements  with 
most of  the  European  countries.  However,  these  agreements appear to  be 
insufficient  to  meet  the  concrete  problems  European  service  providers 
encounter  in  Japan  and,  in  addition,  increasingly  limit  their  business 
opportunities because of  their inflexibility with respect to the evolution of  the 
services  market  (new  services,  evolving regulatory  environments  in  third 
countries). Also,  the fragmentation of  agreements does not allow so far for a 
common European position and requests for improvements in the context of 
objective  market  access  difficulties.  There  are  reports  that,  in  boundary 
cases  and when  negotiating  with  European  type  II carriers,  the  type  I 
carriers  try  to  enforce  the  US/Japan  !VANS  agreement  stipulations  as 
reference. 
3.  LACK OF EFFECTIVE COMPETITION (UNITED STATES) 
The  1984  Modified  Final  Judgment  (MFJ)  divested  AT&T of its  regional/local 
activities  which  are  now performed  by  the Regional  Bell  Operating  Companies 
(RBOCs).  AT&T  retained  the  right  to  offer  long-distance  telecommunications 
services, although in competition with other carriers.  The RBOCs enjoy exclusive 
rights to provide local/regional telecommunications services and are not subject to 
effective competition in these markets. 
3.1. AT&T Dominant Position 
AT  &T's remains the largest US  long-distance carrier providing over 60% of U.S. 
long distance services.  Its strong position as network operator combined with its 
size as an equipment manufacturer gives it a major structural advantage over many 
foreign firms.  This vertical  integration gives AT&T experience in operating and 
maintaining  a  telecommunications  network  in  addition  to  designing  and 
manufacturing  equipment.  Because  no  other  manufacturers  of comparable  size 
operate networks, this is a competitive advantage.  Vertical integration also entails 
the  possibility  of cross-subsidization,  which  has  a  number  of negative  effects 
including  lack  of long-term  competitiveness  for  those  companies  which  are 
competitors in the subsidized activity, in  this case telecommunications equipment 
manufacturing.  Thus, in order to  prevent such cross-subsidization, it is necessary 
to  ensure that the  network operator  is  under effective  competitive pressure (see 
Annex 2). 
3.2. RBOC Exclusive Rights 
Under  current  law,  the  RBOCs  are  prohibited  from  having  vertical  links  with 
respect  of  the  production  of  telecommunications  equipment.  They  enjoy 
monopolies on provision of basic services in their areas of operation, and they are 
subject to regulation in a number of different ways.  The FCC must authorise the 
construction  of new  lines  (S.214  of the  1934  Communications  Act).  It also 
13 regulates tariffs through prict: caps.  Intrastate communications are regulated by the 
local  State  Public  Utility  Commissions  (PUCs)  whose  administration  of price-
setting invoh,cs them  in  all  aspects of RBOCs' operation,  indeed,  it  is  estimated 
that as much as 70% of RBOC  revenue is  regulated  by  PUCs rather than by  the 
FCC.  This  means  that  irrespective  of ownership,  public  or  private,  the  major 
telephone companies in  the US  are  subject to  a major degree of federal  and local 
government control.  These companies are therefore not free  to act on the basis of 
purely commercial criteria. 
The  RBOCs  purchase  approximately  80%  of all  telecommunications  network 
equipment sold in the United States.  Their historical relationship with AT&T and 
their  large  installed  base of AT&T products  have  made  it  difticult for  suppliers 
other than  AT&T to  break  into  the  U.S.  market  for  extensions and upgradings. 
Moreover,  despite  their  exclusive  rights,  the  RBOCs  are  not  subject  to  open 
procurement disciplines.  The result  is  that AT&T and  Northern Telecom supply 
most of the switching requirements of the RBOCs. 
3.3. Two Switching Markets 
There are two separate switching markets in the US: 
The first one is the market for the extension and the upgrading of the installed base: 
according to a NBI study (NBI  1991  Central Office Market Analysis), this market 
will grow from 61% of the total US  s\vitching market in  1991  to 65% in 1995; it is 
the  lucrative  part of the  business,  because of the  "unbundled"  sales of "feature 
software" for the enhancement of  the existing network. 
The second market is  the  market for  new installations:  it  is  mainly a "hardware" 
market and  is  characterized  by  fierce  price  competition.  While  the  incumbents 
(AT&T and  NORTHERN) can afford a price war in  the  new installations market 
because they benefit from the resources derived from  the  feature software market 
for extension and upgrading, the  situation is  obviously very  difficult for  the new 
suppliers as  they  do  not  have  revenues  from  an  installed  base and the  SW sales 
associated  with  new  installations  arc  much  smaller  than  the  SW  sales  for  the 
upgrading of  the installed base: 
Proportion ofHW and SW in the US switching markets 
(Source: NBI  1991  Central Office Market Analysis) 
1991  1995 
Markets of new installations  HW  90%  88% 
sw  10%  12% 
Market of installed base  HW  52%  37% 
sw  41l%  63% 
The AT&T  ~ituation in  ils internal  market and the extraordinary benefits deriving 
from  it,  lead  to  pricing so  low in  the only market accessible to  new players (the 
market of new installations) that it prevents or discourages competition. 
14 Thus,  the  AT&T  divestiture  has  not  resulted  in  a  substantial  opening of the 
telecommunications  network  equipment  market  to  third-country  supplier5,  other 
than Northern Telecom, a U.S. subsidiary of  Bell Canada Enterprises. 
Comments 
More  than at any time  in  the  last 20 years,  there is a consensus in private 
industry  and in  Congress  that  the  time  is  ripe  for  a  major  revision of 
communication law.  The essence of  that consensus is to  relax barriers and 
permit much  greater  competition  between  the  local  telephone,  cable and 
long-distance companies,  while protecting consumers as old regulatilJns are 
abandoned in favor of  market place competition.  A Bill is before Congress 
(see Annex 3). 
However,  despite the large array of  initiatives intended to reap benefits from 
the new opportunities,  no  si~nificant European involvement can be  ~tected 
(see  Annex 4).  The  EU is pursuing negotiations  with  the  US  in  order to 
achieve  an  agreement  on  telecommunication  procurement.  These 
negotiations involve also competition aspects. (See also chapter /l-4) 
15 II.  PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
The  Community's  objective  in  public  procurement  is  to  ensure  comparable  and 
effective access for Community undertakings to the markets of  third countries 
1.  PROCUREMENT IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY (JAPAN) 
The signature by Japan of the  government procurement agreement in April  1994 
should  improve  the  situation  described  below.  A  careful  assessment  of its 
consequences will be required. 
1.1. Time for the Preparation of an Offer 
The awards of public contracts has not yet been sufficiently opened.  In particular, 
according to the industry, the time given for the appropriate preparation of an offer 
is not long enough 8. 
Comments 
The  deadlines  for  tenders  are  too  short  for  careful  study  of the 
documentation  and preparation of the  bid.  The  same problem presented 
itself  in the Community and was effectively addressed.  Eurobit has actually 
asked for  equal  access  to  pre-bid  information for foreign  and domestic 
suppliers (see Annex 5). 
1.2. Single Tendering 
The award of contracts by  negotiated procedure without prior call for competition 
in the case of improvement or replacement of  existing installations, known as "zuii" 
contracts 9 gives advantages to former Japanese companies. 
Comments 
Eurobit has  actually asked for reduction of  single  tendering and the  new 
procurement  procedures  recently  published  in  the  framework  of the 
US/Japan  agreement seems to  go  in  that  way.  The  problem existed also 
within the Community and has been effectively tackled (see Annex 5). 
1.3. Technical Specifications 
The  technical  specifications  to  be  adhered  to  in  the  preparation  of offers  are 
prepared by study groups made up of  representatives from former suppliers 10· 
8  Paper by  the Contederation of Gennany Industry  on  "Grievances of Gennan  Industry Towards the Japanese 
Government and Industry"  I 992 
9  "Market Access for European IT-Industry to the Japanese Market" by Eurobit. 
10  "Market Access for European IT-Industry to the Japanese Market" by Eurobit. 
16 Comments 
Eurobit has asked for neutral and non-discriminatory formation of  technical 
specifications and for equal opportunities to participate in the specification-
formulation study groups.  The  problem existed also  within the  Community 
and has been effectively tackled (see Annex 5). 
2.  PROCUREMENT IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY (UNITED 
STATES) 
Under the Buy American Act of 3 March  1933, as  amended and  the ad  hoc  Buy 
American provisions included in the annual authorisation/appropriation legislation, 
federal  governmental  procuring  entities  are  allowed  to  reject  foreign  bids. 
Complementary Buy American legislation is also implemented at state level.  Buy 
American  provisions  may  be  waived  in  particular  in  order  to  allow  the  US  to 
respect  its  international  commitments  (e.g.  GATT  Code,  free  trade  agreement, 
MOU). 
Buy America restrictions may take several forms.  Some straightforwardly prohibit 
public  sector  bodies  from  purchasing  goods  from  foreign  suppliers.  Others 
establish local content requirements ranging from  50% to  65%,  while others still 
extend  preferential  terms  to  domestic  suppliers,  the  price  preference  ranging 
anywhere from 5% to 50%. 
The Defense Appropriation and Authorization acts for the 1994 fiscal year contain 
a Buy America provision in the IT field  for supercomputers and multibeam sonar 
mapping systems and supporting software II. 
Comments 
US  Computer  manufacturers  believe  that  the  "Buy  American  Act" 
discourages  sourcing  decisions  that  allow  US  computer  hardware 
manufacturers  to  remain  competitive  globally.  In  the  increasingly price 
sensitive market,  a number of  successful companies have found it necessary 
to  out-source  components  that  they  cannot  manufacture  competitively 
themselves.  Thus,  domestic content legislation,  which hinders the ability of 
computer firms to obtain the highest quality components at the best possible 
global prices,  impedes the  global competitiveness of  certain  US  computer 
manufacturers. 
Accordingly US industry recommended that there be  a single rule of  origin 
for  government procurement purposes,  that of substantial  transformation 
which  involved a shift  in  tariff classification.  . They  have  also  urged· the 
United States Trade  representative (USTR)  to support the use of  substantial 
II  "Report on United States barriers to trade and investment" ( 1994 by services of  the European Commission, page 31 
17 trans{c1rmation  as  a  unifimn  rule  of  origin  in  the  General Agreement on 
Tarijji and Trade (GA77)12 
Existence ofbilateral or multilateral agreemenls 
A fiJrther EC'IU.\' agreement on procurement was reached in the afiermath of 
the  conclusions of  the  GATT negotiation in April 199-1.  This  increases the 
number of  entities covered under the  new GATT government Procurement 
Agreement, to  enter into force  in January 1st  1996.  Under this agreement, 
access has been extended for the first time for EU suppliers to contracts at 
sub-federal level in 39 States,  including jive ofthe biggest- California, New-
York,  Texas,  Florida  and lflinois  - plus  seven  cities  - Boston,  Chicago, 
Dalla5,  Detroit,  Indianapolis,  Nashville  and San Antonio.  This  agreement 
does  not  cover  telecommunications  equipment  procurement  for  which 
specific bilateral negotiations were undertaken in parallel to the revision of 
the  GAIT  Code  on  procurement  (sec  below  ''procurement  of telecom 
equipment- United States). 
3.  PROCUREMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT (JAPAN) 
Access to  Nippon Telephone and Telegraph's (NIT's) procurement is governed by 
a bilateral US/Japan agreement reached at the end of 1994.  This deal also covers 
all NIT subsidiaries (e.g. DoCoMo).  The agreement gives erga omnes treatment to 
FU firms, although no binding agreement exists.  However, the review mechanisms 
provided  for  under  the  agreement  is  available  only  to  the  US:  the  European 
Commission has made it clear to  the Japanese side that it  wants similar access to 
the review mechanism.  Negotiations are planned between the two parties to arrive 
at an acceptable solution. 
NIT's procurement procedures are divided into three groups: 
- Track  procedures:  general  commodities  (including 
communications  equipment  such  as  fax  machines,  Private 
Exchange  (PBX),  computers,  modems,  etc.)  submitted  to 
Government Procurement A2reement (GPA). 
general 
Branch 
GATT 
- Track II procedures: covering telecommunications equipment available on 
the  market  such  as  switches,  transmission  equipment,  telephone  sets, 
radios,  cables,  etc.;  no  open  tenderin~. not  submitted  to  GATT  GPA. 
(Procedure Ila covers follow-up procurement under II). 
Track  III  procedures:  covering  telecommunications  equipment  llQ1 
available  on  the  market,  i.e.  requiring  new  developments;  open  to 
intemational tenderin2. but not submitted to GAIT GPA. (Procedure Ilia 
covers follow up procurement of products developed under III). 
12  Global  compctitivt:n~s~ of US  advanced-technology  indu;tric~  computers, chapter 3,  page  13  Publication 2705, december 
19'13 
18 Under the previous procedures problem arised from the following practices: 
- Track  II  procedures:  No  possibility  to  tender  for  foreign  entities,  NIT 
tends to  select products from  the  "NIT family"  (Oki,  Fujitsu,  Toshiba, 
NEC,  Hitachi)  with  whom  NTT  generally  tightly  cooperates  for  the 
development of new products (a cooperation which does not necessarily 
involve track III procedures); 
- Track III  procedures:  In principle open to  foreign  players and  fair,  but 
"uncontrollable"; 
(a)  none  of the  "safeguards"  included  in  the  GPA  is  applicable  (in 
particular the  principle of open procedures,  of non-discrimination, 
which  consequently  cannot  be  monitored  or  verified).  EU  firms 
receive erga omnes treatment, but the monitoring procedures put in 
place by the agreement are not yet open; 
(b)  interested firms complain that no  long-term market perspective can 
be  guaranteed  by  NTT  though  significant  start-up  investment  is 
generally  required  from  bidding  firms  to  qualify  as  prototype 
developers; 
(c)  interested firms have no guarantee that know-how brought in during 
the prototype development is not disclosed to third parties; 
(d)  NTT  requires  compliance  to  technical  standards  which  are 
proprietary  to  NIT since  the  Telecommunications  Business  Law 
(TBL) does not impose technical rules other than the "no harm to the 
network"  conditions.  In  practice,  foreign  firms  (especially 
newcomers) are disadvantaged vis-a-vis Japanese players who do not 
generally know in detail NTT's specifications. In addition, NTT as a 
dominant  carrier  can  impose  de  facto  standards  which  will  be 
endorsed by NTT's competitors, the New Common Carriers (NCC); 
The  new  agreement  obliges  NTT  to  use  international  or de  facto 
standards, without specifying what the latter comprises; 
e)  Criteria for tender decisions will be based on the "economically most 
advantageous offer" approach; 
(f)  no  challenge  procedure  (o~er than  an  NIT internal  ombudsman 
scheme) is foreseen. 
Concerning the management of  the bilateral agreement, EU objectives are: 
- Maintain the Erga Omnes status for European firms  interested in tenders 
(procedural wise, but also in practice through including European firms in 
the  scope  of the  flanking  measures  of NTT,  such  as,  procurement 
information distribution, request for cooperation in establishing technical 
standards  mandatory  for  NTT  procurement,  etc.),  whilst  ensuring  a 
maximum  of  transparency  of  the  procedures  under  the  given 
circumstances. 
19 This is to  be  pursued as an overriding priority , namely to see telecommunications 
equipment  procurement  by  market  dominant  players  in  Japan,  including  NTT, 
covered  by  a public  code.  In  this  sense,  NTT's  procurement  falls  equally on the 
chapter of the general procurement where the object formulated is to include NTT 
in  the  list  of  entities  covered  by  the  harmonised  public  procurement  code 
established in Japan. 
3.1.  GOVERNMENT TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROCUREMENT 
The govemement of Japan also reached a bilateral deal with the US  in November 
1994 on the procurement of telecommunications equipment by central government 
agencies.  The  main  procuring  agencies  that  are  affected  by  this  deal  are  the 
Ministry  of Posts  and  Telecommunications,  the  Ministry  of Transport,  and  the 
police service.  The deal provides for a number of GPA compatible rules governing 
contract tendering, selection and award procedures.  No  numerical targets for the 
number  or  value  of  contracts  awarded  to  non-Japanese  firms  were  agreed. 
However, although the EU firms are given erga ornnes treatment by the agreement, 
the fact  that the monitoring  arrangements  are  not  yet open mean that there  is  a 
danger of  discrimination in practice in favour of US firms. 
Comments 
The  1992 IT&T trade flows show an export-import ratio of  53% on total EC 
IT&T trade.  Compared to  this figure,  the  4% export-import ratio for IT&T 
trade with Japan seems to be extremely low. 
This  contrasting  picture  occurs  in  all  IT&T  sectors,  but  above  all  in 
telecommunications equipment,  where the export-import ratios are 107% for 
total trade  and 3% for trade  with  Japan.  (An  export-import ratio greater 
than 100% indicates exports exceed imports.) 
Indeed,  there  is  no  national  legislation  which  obliges  NIT  to  follow 
principles of transparency and non-discrimination.  Instead,  only political 
pressure can ensure that NIT does not deviate from it. 
In particular,  it seems that NIT's approach towards technical specifications 
is  solely based on  the  aim  of ensuring network integrity and functioning. 
NIT may not give much attention to  the  economic impact of  standards and 
technical specifications. 
About 95% of  the NIT's purchases come from the NIT  family (NEC,  Fujitsu, 
OK!,  Hitachi,  Toshiba and others): 
A  Community  company  has  allegedly  been forced  to  withdraw from  the 
Japanese  market although  it  has successfully bid for a public contrac( by 
NIT because NIT's switch market is  too  small to justify the  high costs of 
having its product conform to  Japanese standards and no  other purchaser 
could be found despite NIT's assurances to the contrary. 
NIT has  seen  a steady decline  in  profits  in  the  last four fiscal years,  as 
erosion of its  share  in  the  long distance  market continued.  The  Japanese 
20 government  is  planning to  allow  NIT,  still  65. 7%  government  owned,  to 
raise  local  telephone  rates  in  order  to  revamp  the  nation's 
telecommunications system.  The  investment in  Japan's  telecommunication 
network is  seen  as  the  centrepiece  of an  economic  stimulus package.  A 
combination of higher rates  and government spending should allow NIT 
room  to fatten profits.  President  Masashi  Kojima  announced on  7 April 
1993 that NIT would invest around 2 trillion yen per year in order to invest 
a  total  of 45  trillion  yen  (US$395  billion)  to  complete  its  optical-fiber 
networks during the next 22 years. 
Community Law 
The problem of  extending tendering procedures to  telecommunications bids 
has been addressed and solved by  the  Council Directive of 1  7 September 
1990  on  the  procurement procedures of entities  operating  in  the  water, 
energy, transport and telecommunications sectors 13 which applies equally to 
undertakings  over  which  the  public  authorities  may  exercise  directly  or 
indirectly a dominant influence in particular by virtue of  their ownership of 
it. 
Existence o.fBilateral and Multilateral Agreements 
In  the framework of  the  GAIT negotiations,  the Japanese government has 
offered to include track I NIT telecommunications equipemnt under the GPA 
provided that the procedures spelled out in  their bilateral agreement with 
the US also apply. 
4.  PROCUREMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT (UNITED STATES) 
4.1  ATT procurement 
A  TI is not subject  to  open  procurement rules  and  buys  all  of its  central  office 
equipment,  representing  about  8%  of  the  total  U.S.  market,  from  its  own 
manufacturing  subsidiary14.  AT&T's  internal  market  for  telecom  equipment 
(switching, transmission and  cables) amounts to  more than $  1.5  billion p.a.  In 
total, this is a $  1.5  billion market which is structurally out of reach of European 
competitors.  As a telecommunications manufacturer AT&T is a principal supplier 
to  the  regional  Bell  Companies.  With  regard  to  the  RBOC's,  the  procurement 
process  is  not  very  transparent  - intimate  knowledge  of their  organisation  and 
preference is necessary-.  The process inherently favours those suppliers which are 
most familiar with the RBOCs. 
13  L 297/1 dated 29.10.90 
14  Communications from  the Commission "The European Telecommunications Equipment Industry, the State of Play, Issues at 
Stake and Proposals for Action" - SEC (92)  I  049 final - pages 20-21 
21 Comments 
In  ils  response  to  the  Commission's  communication  on  the 
telecommunications equipment industry,  the  European  Telecommunications 
and Professional Electronics Industry (ECTEL) stated that 15: 
"The  CEC should insist that regulated operating companies (having special 
or  exclusive  rights),  whether  privately  or  publicly  owned,  follow 
procurement procedures which are comparable to  those enforced within the 
EC.  in  order to demonstrate that such procedures are based exclusively on 
sound commercial considerations. 
Moreover,  even in the absence of  special or exclusive rights,  in the case of  a 
dominant position,  a telecom operator vertically integrated with a supplier 
should follow procurement procedures comparable in their effect to the ones 
in plaa in the European Community. " 
More generally,  any assessment of  the level of  Community access to the US 
network equipment market is  difficult.  because of  a variety of  factors,  such 
as  the  insufficient  transparency  in  Regional  Bell  Operating  Companies 
(RBOL}  and AT&T procurement  procedures,  the  special  rights  and/or 
dominant position enjoyed by these  utilities.  the existence on this market of 
strong manufacturers  who  are  also  carriers,  the  influence of the  Federal 
Communications  Commission  (FCC)  and  of State  Public  Commissions 
(PUC)  on  the  procurement practice  which  create  little  incentive  to  buy 
competitively.· AT&T and Northern Telecom have almost a duopoly position 
in  the  equipment  market.  Moreover,  AT&T also  benefits from  a  set  of 
advantages such as the company's lar!{e  installed base; the fact that network 
specifications  are  based  on  the  requirements  of  the  AT&T 
telecommunications network and the  influence that the  company has on the 
standardisation process in the  US. 
Existence QfBilateral or Multilateral Afreements 
Telecommunication  equipment  is  at  present  excluded  from  the  GATT 
Procurement Code - apart from the partial inclusion of  NTT in Japan.  In the 
framework  of the  GATT  negotiations,  the  US  side  has  refrained from 
extending the  coverage  of  provisions  on  public procurement to  the  many 
private  entities  which  carry our  their  activities  under  special or _exclusive 
rights  This implies in particular that the telecommunication operators were 
not included in the American offer. 
Negotiations in the Uruguay Round have proved inconclusive because of  the 
lack of  political willingness from the  US side to  make commitment.  This  is 
on the ground that their market is  "open" while other countries markets are 
"closed".  An assumption that is  now patently flawed.  The  Commission has 
15  "Industrial Policy for the Telecommunications Equipment Industry" by ECTEL, December )992 
22 concerns that the US with a leading position in the services market.  regards 
bilateralitism and reciprocity as the quickest route to market access. 
4.2  US unilateral sanctions 
Access to US public procurement may be  impeded to EU  operators following the 
US government's decision to impose sanctions against the EU, on the grounds that 
procurement  practices  in  the  EU  are  discriminatory  for  US  interests.  Two 
instruments are available: Title VII of  the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988  and the  Telecommunications Trade  Act of 1988.  In particular the  US 
Trade representative, M.  Kantor announced on 30 April  1994 that the US  would 
maintain sanctions imposed on 28  May 1993  against the EU operators because of 
the  EU's  remammg  discriminatory  procurement  practices  in  the 
telecommunications  equipement  sector.  These  US  sanctions  prevent  European 
bidders from participating in some Federal agency contracts for supplies, services 
contracts and construction. 
Comments 
The  US  administration  has put forward the figure  of $19  million for the 
estimated impact of  its 28 May 1993 decision to  exclude European bidders 
from some US federal procurement.  At that time,  the EU reacted by deciding 
on 8 June  1993  to  impose  counter sanctions against  US  operators,  which 
mirror US sanctions.  The EU counter sanctions are also still inforceJ6 
5.  PROCUREMENT OF SATELLITE (JAPAN) 
The commercial satellite market has been opened in April 1990 to  forei~n suppliers 
through  US-Japan  bilateral  negotiations.  This  represents  about  50%  of the 
Japanese satellite demand.  US  companies have benefited most from this change. 
Experimental satellites will be kept within the domestic industry.  For true opening, 
the question is what the new Japanese satellite schedule will be, and how much of 
the  technology  used  in  experimental  satellites  will  be  required  in  the  future 
specifications of  the commercial satellites 11. 
16  "Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment" 1994 Services of  the Commission,page 32 
17  "The Japanese Telecommunications Procurement Market" by EGIS.  August 1990 
23 Comments 
Since  Japan  opened  the  market  to  international  bidders,  all  three 
commercial satellites bought by Japan,  were sold by US companies.  The EC 
has  requested  that  Japan  apply  erga  omnes  treatment  for  satellite 
procurement.  A  non-paper  of the  MPT  confirmed  that  the  satellite 
procurement procedures are  applied on  a  non-discriminatory  basis  to  all 
nations.  However,  a bilateral consulting mechanism provided for disputes 
with the  US government does not apply to the EC  Thus,  as far as complaint 
mechanisms are concerned, preferential treatment is provided  for the US 
24 III.  STATE AIDS 
The Community's objective in state aids is  to eliminate illegal aids and to achieve 
comparable award conditions. 
1.  STATE AIDS (UNITED STATES) 
1.1. HPCC 
Under  the  programme  for  High  Performance  Computing  and  Communication 
(HPCC) firms may benefit from up to 1  00% funding subsidies unlike the maximum 
50% funding scheme of  Esprit.  Also the aids extend far beyond R&D and cover all 
costs prior to commercial sale.  (See annex 6). 
Comments 
Such  a  high  rate  of aid  would  not  be  allowed  under  the  Community 
framework of  state aids for R&D and the scope of  the aid could not extend 
beyond R&D.  The  goal of the  HPCC programme  is  to  develop computer 
architectures that can achieve a trillion mathematical operations per second 
- two or three orders of  magnitude above current performance levels.  The 
systems that seem most likely to develop this power first are called massively 
parallel  supercomputers.  Conventional  supercomputers  have  a  small 
number - usually fewer than 16 - of  very fast processing units working on a 
problem.  In  contrast,  the  massively  parallel  systems  can  have  several 
hundred or even thousand slower processing units. 
The  TFLOPS machine performance is  1, 000 times faster than that of  current 
supercomputers,  and the  Grand Challenge aims at the  achievement of  this 
level in 1995.  Problems which require 500 hours ofCPU time will be solved 
in only 0.5 hours.  Furthermore,  if  tasks can be  accomplished 1,000 times 
faster than at present, not only the area of  science and technology,  but also 
basic intelligent labor in all areas such business,  and culture and arts will 
be influenced and drastic change will take place. 
On  12 January 1994,  Bell Atlantic Corp.  announced that it will spend some 
$25 million for three new supercomputers plus software to build a first leg. of 
the  information  superhighway.  Two  companies,  nCube  Inc  and software 
maker Oracle Systems Corp.,  will share the .spoils.  With  the  Bell Atlantic. 
deal a new market is opening: giant servers to feed digitized movies,  home 
shopping, games and other interactive multimedia services to  homes across 
the country.  Selling servers for movies on demand could help develop other 
markets such as  video-based business information  services.  For  instance 
DEC envisions setting up media service centers around the country to  help 
detailers create video-shopping services. 
In  digital form,  a  feature  film  takes  2  billion  characters,  or  bytes,  of 
computer storage-Just a few dozen of  the  tapes in any video store would,  if 
digitalized,  exceed the  100  billion  bytes  or so  used by the  largest  airline 
reservation system and unlike banking transactions video data streams can 
25 tolerate no more than microscopic delays in  transmission  There  are xood 
reasons  why digital  data  should he  more  expensive  than  traditional  text, 
recordings or video.  Fur one thing,  inj(Jrmatiun in digital form can be easily 
transmitted,  edited and manipulated \Yith a computer to find trends, patterns 
or  insights.  That  makes  it  more  yaluahle  to  the  user.  For  another, 
converting text  and images  (e.g  photographs,  charts  and paintings)  into 
digital form can be costly.  This is one reason why less than  1% of  mankind 
documented  knowledge  has  been  captured  in  digital  form..  Computer 
archives  go  back  only  12  years  (i.e  to  when  newspapers  began  using 
computerised  type-setting).  This  leaves  more  than  99%  of the  world's 
knowledge in books, reports and other publications gathering dust on library 
shelves. 
That  is  why  many  players  are  insisting  that  only  a  massively  parallel 
machine -such as the nCube machine selected by Bell Atlantic will do. 
While hundreds of  computers such as n(  'ube will be needed to move digitized 
data from point to point,  legions of  workers will be  needed to  digitalize the 
data  10  be  moved.  It  will then be  up  10  the  sojiware developpers to  write 
programmes to make the data really accessible and hardware manufacturers 
to offer equipment to present the data easily and effectively. 
1.2.  Flat Panels Displays 
In  the  biggest  industrial  policy  move  since  the  creation  of Sematech  the  US 
govenunent has approved a plan to  spend up to  $  1 billion to  help the  American 
flat-panel computer display screen industry compete with Japan.  The plan involves 
a  partnership  between  more  than  a  dozen  of US  companies  and  the  Defense 
Department in a bid to  overtake Japan's lead in the manufacture of thin electronic 
screens. 
The  plan  goes  far  beyond  Sematech,  a  consortium  that  has  limited  itself  to 
developing computer-chip production techniques but does not sell chips.  For flat-
panel displays, which are thin computer screens mainly  used  in  laptop computers 
and  other  portables  devices,  the  govenunent  wants  to  help  with  research  and 
development, the construction of  commercial factories and even marketing. 
The  plan  calls  for  the  Defense  Department  to  contribute  $  50  million  for  the 
immediate  construction  of a  high-capacity  pilot  plant,  while  the  Defense  and 
Energy Department would jointly spend  $  450  million  to  subsidize development 
over the next five years.  The government is already subsidizing the construction of 
a small pilot plant in Michigan. 
ln order to  support this partnership a provision has  been added to  H.R.  4650,-the 
Defense Department Appropriations Bill, that would prohibit the department from 
procuring  flat  panel  displays  unless  they  are  produced  and  manufactured  in  the 
United States by a domestic-owned and domestic-operated entity. 
26 Comments 
The  companies which include Xerox Corp.  and AT  &  T submitted a proposal 
to the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency on January I 5,  I 993, five 
days before President Bill C{inton was to be inaugurated. 
The plan, if  approved by Congress,  would be a major example of  government 
backing for an  industry viewed as important to  US competitiveness.  If  the 
United States  does  succeed in  becoming a major  competitor  in  the  mass 
manufacture of  "Flat-Panel" display screens,  it will be a surprising turn in a 
story that many have cited as a startling example of  US failure to exploit its 
own technological breakthroughs. 
Several American companies invented the screens more than three decades 
ago.  But Japanese companies took the lead in manufacturing them for lap-
top computers and other products,  and many American companies closed 
their doors in the face of  competition. 
American computer makers such as Apple Computer Inc.  have bemoaned the 
lack of a  US  display  industry,  which  has forced them  to  rely mainly on 
imported screens.  The  lack of an  American  industry  also  has potential 
national security implications.  In  the future,  the  screens  will  be  used in 
military  ships,  armored  vehicles,  fighter  plane  cockpits,  training 
programmes and command and control centres.  They will also be  used in 
wall-mounted  televisions,  video-phones  and  space  vehicles;  nearly 
everywhere information is displayed electronically. 
American companies currently account for less than 5 % of  a $ 3. 5 billion 
industry,  one that is expected to swell to$ 8.4 billion by I995 and to$ 15.2 
billion by the year 2000. 
Industry sources said there  were several reasons why American companies 
have  decided to  band together  with  the  Defense  Department  including a 
sense  of urgency  over  Japan's  efforts  to  develop  a  new  generation  of 
displays.  Some industry sources estimate the Japanese are outspending the 
United  States  more  than  20  to  I  on  flat-panel  research,  with  the  lead 
Japanese  company,  Sharp  Co,  having committed close  to  $  I  billion for 
research and development between I 99 I and 1993. 
Existence ofBilateral or Multilateral Aweements 
Under the GATT subsidy code,  a subsidy on R&D may be non-actionable if 
"the assistance covers not more than  75% of  the cost of  industrial research 
or 50% of  the costs of  pre-competitive development activity". 
27 2.  STATE AIDS (JAPAN) 
The $ 116  billion stimulus package adopted by  the  Japanese government features 
prominently  the  "Mandala  Project  on  High  Performance  Computing  and 
Communications 18.  The project is a direct response to the US  government's High 
Perfonnance Computing  and  Communications  Program.  The  Japanese  say  they 
fear their industry could be held hostage by a U.S.  refusal to  grant Japan access to 
"this closed (HPCC) intellectual possession". 
Therefore, the "urgent employment of HPCC (in the United States) will control life 
in  the  future  of Japan."  With  the  "drastic  improvement  in  perfonnance  in 
computing  networking  environments  used  for  intelligent  work  in  manufacturing 
and  service  businesses...  Japanese  research  development  power,  industrial 
manufacturing power and economic competitive power will decrease in quantity as 
well as quality.  Long-tenn decrease in GNP and the standard of living will occur 
within a few years." 
The central part of Japan's HPCC program would be the creation of 10 centers for 
high performance computing.  These would be open to manufacturers as well as to 
public and educational organizations throughout Japan.  Like the supercomputing 
centers in the United States, they would be  tied together by  a gigabit-per-second 
network.  "To build nationwide HPCC centers quickly and smoothly, it would be 
most effective to establish a foundation by collecting funds from  Government and 
the private sector," says the Mandala project summary. 
The program would "borrow" one trillion yen from the government for use over 10 
years and would spend 100 billion yen a year. 
Detailed expenses 
HPCC Centers (10 locations) 
Super High Speed Network 
Project Operation expense 
Business Office Activity Expense 
Fund Accumulation 
TOTAL 
50 billion Yen 
20 billion Yen 
1  0 billion Yen 
1  0 billion Yen 
1  0 billion Yen 
100 billion Yen/year 
18  Report on "Mandala Project on High Performance Computing and Communications". 
28 The  Community's  objective  is  to  ensure  that  Japan  and  the  US  implement  and 
enforce the principle of  national treatment. 
1.  STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS (JAPAN) 
1.1.  Video products 
Examination  and  authorisation  procedures  at  the  import  stage  are  far  more 
complicated  than  the  corresponding  procedures  for  national  producers.  In 
particular, the norms and standards are used to partition off  the national market. 
The  Japanese  authority  has  published  two  different  guide-lines  for  foreign  and 
national products and has thus made a distinction between treatment reserved for 
national products and that applied to foreign products. 
Video  products  and  especially  televisions  need  a  lot  of  alterations  and 
developments to conform to local specifications.  These products must conform to 
the requirements of the "T" norm, as laid down in the law on electrical appliances 
and the control of  materials.  The competent organisation is the MITI 19• 
Optional norms that apply to certain products can be much more insidious.  They 
can hold up sales quite considerably because retailers refuse to distribute products 
that have not been officially recognised.  Apart from the image of  guarantee, safety 
and good quality that is given by these norms, an insurance is attached to certain of 
them and thus the retailer is  not held responsible in  the case of a problem or an 
accident.  It is  the  organisation which delivered the  norm  who  compensates the 
victim directly.  It is thus in the retailers' interest to select preferably articles which 
are "guaranteed", not only from a financial viewpoint but for its image. 
Comments 
Certification procedures for materials can hold up and even block access to 
a market.  It  is therefore necessary to  take  into account the  equivalence of 
standards and certification procedures. 
In  Europe,  electronic  products  .must  conform  with  the  Low  Tension 
Directive 20.  One  of  the  means of  proof is  the  declaration of  meeting the 
norms delivered by t~e manufacturer.  This  means that a Japanese product 
can be  immediately available  on the  European  market  witho1,1t  a previous 
control. 
In Japan the standards to conform with are national and specific as they .are 
provided  for under the electrical appliances and materials control law.  This 
19  "The Distribution of  Consumer Electronics in Japan" by BIS Strategic Decisions- page 19 
20  The Directive (73/23/EEC of 19 .2. 73) covers electrical material intended to be used at a nominal1evel of tension 
of  between .SO and  1.000 volts for alternate current. 
29 law provides  in  particular  that all products  bear  the  mark of safety  "T" 
(triangle) 21.  However,  the  ways  of obtaining  this  mark  are  different 
depending on whether a given product is Japanese or imported 
For products made  in  Japan,  it  is  the  manufacturer's  workshop  which  is 
officially recognised,  allowing thus  the product's immediate  entry into  the 
market. 
The importer must first submit each batch of  goods to a control by approved 
testing laboratories whereupon MIT! authorises the  manufacturer to  place 
the mark "T".  The whole procedure creates delays of  up to three months for 
the effective market entry. 
It is also worthwhile to mention that under Article 54 of  the Material Control 
Law,  electrical appliances and materials for export may,  in accordance with 
cabinet order,  be exempted from the application of  provisions of  this law or 
be given special consideration. 
1.2. Terminals (See annex 7) 
For terminals, there exists a restricted group called "Harmonisation of Advanced 
Telecommunications Services" (HATS) which gathers representatives of Japanese 
industry in  order to ensure the compatibility of the respective equipment.  After 
testing a  label  is  put on the  equipment.  No  Community  finn  has ever tried to 
participate  in  HATS.  The  telecommunication  terminal  equipement  is  the  main 
source  of the  large  and  growing  telecommunications  trade  deficit  between  the 
Community and Japan. 
Comments 
The  great  importance  of terminals  lies  in  their  role  as  the  interface  to 
networks and services for the customers and in their consumption of  state of 
the  art micro-electronics in  large volumes.  A further erosion of  European 
terminal  manufacturing  will  therefore  have  consequences  on  the  micro-
electronics components industry in  the  EC and on  the  ability of  European 
service providers to  compete in  the  longer term  where  there  is  a need for 
dedicated terminals to cover specific services. 
The  terminal  market  represents  an  important  segment  of  the 
telecommunications  equipment  market  (nearly  10  billion  Eculyear)  and 
European  industry  shows  a  real  weakness  in  this  sector.  Nearly  three 
quarter  of the  Community's  imports  from  Japan  consist  of terminal 
equipment with over half  of  the imports being accounted for by fax machines 
and parts. 
21  For category  A electrical  appliances  and  materials  (appliances  and  materials  particularly  liable  to  cause  risk  and  injury 
judging from their structure, method of usc and other conditions of use): 425 products. 
30 Existence o/Bilateral or Multilateral A s:reements 
In  the  GATT framework,  the code an  the technical barriers to trade  (I'BT) 
provides far  an  obligation  inter  alia  to  notify  the  standards  and marks 
adapted by the contracting parties and encourage the conclusion of  mutual 
recognition agreements (MRA) 
On  21  September 1992 the  Council has approved the  negotiating mandate 
concerning mutual recognition agreements on conformity assessment which 
aims at facilitating trade in the regulated sectors.  Japan is included in the 
mandate as one of  the ten priority countries to negotiate with.  One of  these 
sectors  covers  telecommunication  terminal  equipment  (Dir  911263/EEC). 
The  situation  concerning  the  structure  and functioning  of the  Japanese 
standardisation  and  certification  systems  and  their  relationship  with 
informal provisions or voluntary codes of  practice far access to the market is 
presently not fully transparent.  The  Commission has held exploratory talks 
with Japan. 
2.  OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS {JAPAN) 
2.1. Type I Carriers 
Ownership restrictions are placed on what are known as "Type I carriers".  Foreign 
ownership is restricted to a 33% investment. 
Furthermore, this 33% is divided between several countries.  As a result individual 
foreign companies acquire a comparatively small percentage holding.  This holding 
does not allow the participant to  exercise a decisive role  in the organisation and 
management of  the Type I operator. 
With  respect  to  international  communications  there  are  foreign  ownership 
restrictions limited to  25%.  There are also. restrictions on foreign  ownership of 
radio  licences.  This  means  ownership of a licence  to  use  the  electro-magnetic 
spectrum.  Many forms  of communications involve  the  use  of radio  waves,  i.e. 
radio, television, satellite communications, etc22. 
Comments 
A company has alleged that in the allocation of  share  holdings,  US firms are 
treated mare favourably  than  European  firms.  This  state  of affairs  is 
believed to reflect the more effective lobbying of  the US government. 
2.2. Company Acquisition 
The  European  Business  Council  (EBC),  which  represents  European  companies 
established in Japan, has on the occasion of Mr. Bangemann's visit to Japan (end of 
March 1993), drawn his attention to the very low number of Japanese companies 
22  "Market access problems in Japan-State of  play" by the Commission services, April  1994, page 14 
31 that have been acquired by foreign companies, although there has been an increase 
recently, i.e. 37 acquisitions in 1992 against 15 in  1989 (see Annex 8). 
Japan's lack of receptivity to  foreign investment has the effect of a trade barrier in 
today's  global  economy  where  investment  pulls  trade.  Foreign  subsidiaries  or 
affliates  frequently  purchase  or  sell  to  the  parent  companies  back  home,  to  the 
extent that intracompany trade constitutes 30 to 40 percent of total world trade in 
manufactures.  The effective denial to establish majority owned subsidiaries which 
source from  their affiliates  translates  into  a  substantial  loss  of potential  exports 
from foreign firms to potential Japanese subsidiaries 23. 
When buying a Japanese company, the Japanese government has the right of veto 
on  the  basis  of vague  provisions  (article  26  of the  law  on  the  control  of 
international commerce and transactions) 24 (see Annex 9). 
Comments 
A part of  transactions,  concerning the  in-flow of  foreign funds,  are defined 
as  "direct  domestic  investments"  and  therefore  are  excluded from  the 
definition  of capital  transactions;  the  relevant  provisions  are  therefore 
different from those applicable to  the flow of  internal funds,  i.e.  this implies 
that no right of  veto is applicable to  them.  The  category of  direct domestic 
investments, etc.  employs a concept of  ''foreign investor" as a party involved, 
which differs from either the concept of  resident or non-resident.  For direct 
domestic investments,  the  administration's main concerns rest upon how to 
discern and regulate the  transactions after effects such as  how or to  what 
extent  the  recipient  business  concerned is  controlled by foreign  investors 
etc., rather than how to regulate the flow funds crossing the border. 
2.3. Different Types of Carriers 
The telecommunications business law (TBL) of April  1985  distinguishes between 
types  of carriers  based  on  facilities  ownership  (see  Annex  10).  Additional 
regulatory guidelines cloud this distinction by  introducing the concepts of "basic" 
and "enhanced" services.  The services type II carriers can otTer are limited by these 
definitions.·  Yet,  type  I carriers are  free  to  enter into  enhanced services without 
sufficient safeguards to ensure fair competition 25· 
The Japanese government is expected to adopt a fast-track package of deregulation 
measures in the near future. 
23  Section on Japan from the 1994 US national trade estimate report on foreign trade barriers, page  168. 
24  United States-Japan Trade White Paper 1993 by the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ) 
25  Umted States-Japan Trade White Paper 1993 by the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ) 
32 3.  OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS (UNITED STATES) 
3.1. Common carrier services 
Foreigners are virtually precluded from offering common carrier (telephone, telex, 
etc.) services in the US  using radio communications by  the ownership restrictions 
imposed on common carriers under the US Communications Act (47 U.S.C.). 
Comments 
There is a significant part of  the US domestic market to which EC companies 
have,  in principle, unrestricted access,  i.e. private services. 
Section 310 does not apply to companies offering non-common (or private 
carrier) communications.  Entities which lease or own domestic transporter 
capacity may offer that capacity to  users on a non-common carrier basis. 
The difference between carriers 26 and non-common carriers tends to be that 
common carriers may provide services which  interconnect with the public 
switched  network,  while  a  non-common  carrier  provides  private 
communications  to  closed  user  groups  (i.e.  not  to  the  general  public). 
However,  common carrier is not a  well-defined term  and there  are  many 
sub-issues of  law and  fact upon which the outcome may turn in a particular 
case.  Hence  it may often be  difficult for a would-be  license  applicant to 
predict its licensability under Title Ill  of  the Act. 
Section  310  obliges foreign  carriers  either  to  enter  into  subcontracting 
arrangements with US carriers, or to use alternative (non-radio) technology. 
The  ultimate rationale for these restrictions is the argument that US control 
of  communications is essential at all times, for reasons of  national security. 
3.2. Radio Communications (See annex 11) 
Section  31 0 of the  Communications  Act of 1934  imposes  limitation on  foreign 
investment  in radio  communications:  no  broadcast  (or  aeronautical  en  route  or 
fixed  radio  station  licence)  may  be  held  by  foreign  governments,  aliens, 
corporations in which any officer or director is an alien or of  which more than 20% 
of the capital stock is owned by an alien (25% if the ownership is  indirect).  As 
most common carriers need to  integrate radio transmission stations, satellite earth 
stations and in some cases, microwave towers in their network, foreign-owned US 
common carriers are unable to  compete in much of  the long-distance market, and 
only through a minority shareholding in the mobile market 27 
26  Communications Act of 1934, Sec 3(h): "Common carrier" or "carrier" means any person engaged as a common 
carrier  for  hire,  in  interstate  or foreign  communication  by  wire  or  radio  or  in  interstate  or  foreign  radio 
transmission of energy, except where  reference  is  made to  common  carriers not subject to  this  Act ...  (i.e. a 
common carrier is a common carrier!). 
27  Report on United States Trade and Investment Barriers ( 1993) by  Services of the Commission of the European 
Communities • page 72 
33 Comments 
Opening the US telecommunicalions market to British operators will lest U,')' 
regulatory  authorities,  and  the  outcome  is  like~y  to  have  sign~ficant 
implications for access to the US market by other overseas operators 
Cable  &  Wireless,  the  UK  Telecommunications group is  seeking a  waiver 
from a restriction on foreign operators owning more than 25% of  a company 
holding a  radio-based licence  in  the  US  The  waiver application  to  the 
Federal  Communications  Commission,  is  prompted  by  the  prospect  of 
licence  being  granted  nationwide for  personal  communications  services 
(PCS) a new cellular mobile technology. 
More than 400 licences will be granted for franchise  areas across the US 
The  contest  for  licences  will  be  fought  fiercely  among  US  Telecoms 
operators: more than $10 billions is expected tv be raised by the government 
in fees. 
The  FCC  has  discretion  tv  issue  a  waiver  and  will judge  the  ('  &  W 
application on its  merits.  The  terms of this  rulings  are  that  the  US  has 
placed no bar on foreign ownership of  licences for personal communications 
networks, the UK equipvalent of  PCS  One  network was launched last year, 
in wich US West has a 50% share with C &  Wits partner. 
The  2  5% ceiling dates back to  the first world war and its was imposed for 
security reasons.  Despite this the evidence of  openess in the UK could lead 
to  a  change  of policy  with  regard tv  the  UK.  The  decision  has  wider 
ramijications.  British  Telecommunications  has  sought  and  obtained  a 
clearance by the FCC of  its joint venture with MCI as AT  & T has obtained a 
licenc·e to operate in the UK. 
3.3.  Mergers, Acquisitions and Takeovers 
Section 5021  of the  1988 Trade Act, the so-called Exon-Florio amendment (from 
the  names  of its  sponsors),  provides  that  the  President  or  his  nominee  may 
investigate the  effects  on US  national  security  of any  mergers,  acquisitions  and 
takeovers  which  could  result  in  foreign  control  of legal  persons  engaged  in 
interstate  commerce  in  the  US.  This  screening  is  carried  out  by the  Treasury-
chaired Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) 28 (see Annex 12). 
2tl  !Jnltc:d States-Japan Trade White l'aper 1993 by the American Chamber of Commerce: in Japan (ACCJ) 
34 4.  CONDITIONAL NATIONAL TREATMENT (UNITED STATES) 
4.1. Advanced Technology Programme (A TP) 
Already in  the  past, there  have  been US  provisions conditioning the granting of 
national treatment to foreign-controlled economic operators by reciprocity clauses 
or the fulfiment of perfonnance requirements 29•  Under the Advanced Technology 
Programme (ATP), a company's eligibility to receive financial assistance under the 
programme depends on a detennination by the Department of  Commerce of  the US 
economic  interests  as  evidenced  by  the  company's  investment  in  the  US,  its 
significant employment contributions,  and  local  manufacturing  and  procurement 
from  competitive suppliers.  Furthennore, the ATP  submits  foreign-owned  finn's 
participation to reciprocity and non-gennane conditions regarding local investment 
and intellectual property rights protection.  (See Annex 13) 
4.2  Proliferation of  conditional national treatment 
Under the  current,  103  rd, Congress, there has  been  a marked  increase  in  draft 
legislative proposals which seek to condition national treatment for foreign-owned 
companies.  The following legislation regarding R&D is affected: 
National Cooperative Production Amendments Act of 1993, signed into law on 
IOJune 1993; 
- National Competitiveness Act (S 4 I HR.820) 
- Aeronautical Technology Consortium Act (S 41"9 I HR 1675); 
National Environmental Technology Act (S 978); 
Hydrogen Future Act (HR 14 79); 
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorisation Act (HR 2200); 
- Omnibus Space Commercialisation Act (HR 2731 ); 
Defense Authorization Legislation (HR 240 I I S 1298); 
Authorization for the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (HR 3485); 
- Environmental Technologies Act of 1994 (HR 3870) 
The discrimination of non-US  controlled companies  is  mainly  brought about by 
two different kinds of conditioning the granting of national treatment.  On the one 
hand, there is the straightforward conditioning of  nation~l treatment towards private 
operators by  requiring the  country of origin of the foreign  economic operator to 
29  Cf. Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Primary Dealers Act of 1988; American 
technology  Preeminence  Act  including  the  technology  Administration  Authorization  Act  of  1991;  National  Critical 
technologies Act of 1991; Advanced Manufacturing technology Act of 1991; Energy policy Act of 1992. 
35 grant reciprocal treatment to  US  companies which are economically active in  that 
country in order for the foreign company to receive formal national treatment in the 
US.  It is  important to  note that the reciprocity conditions is  not always related to 
the sector in which the foreign company is active in the US, but may also be cross-
sectoral.  Furthermore, the  proposed  US  legislation contains distinctive operative 
conditions either in the form of a definition of the notion of "US company", or in 
the  form  of additional  performance  requirements  for  non-US  companies.  In 
general, the  performance  requirements  formally  apply  to  all  economic  operators 
whether or not they are domestic or foreign-controlled, and thus do not constitute a 
de jure deviation from the formal  national treatment principle.  However, in these 
cases  foreign-controlled  enterprises can  face  indirect,  de  facto  discrimination,  in 
that  they  experience  more  practical  difficulties  than  US  firms  in  fulfilling  the 
performance requirements. 
Comments 
Even if  the need  for the  US Administration to seek the best value for US tax-
payer's money is acceptable,  this does not necessitate the exclusion of  non-
US companies from all federally funded R&D projects.  In particular,  some 
European firms  already  have  substantial  research  operations  in  the  US, 
which  contribute substantially to  the  development of  the  US  technological 
base;  it seems inappropriate that they should be  arbitrarily excluded from 
funded projects.  While the Administration has normally resisted Congress's 
proposals for CNT,  it has often not done so very vociferously; equally,  it has 
not pressed ahead with its own internal reflections on what constitutes a US 
company for the purpose of  defining automatic eligibility to federal funding. 
5.  SATELLITES AND SATELLITE LAUNCH SERVICES (UNITED STATES) 
The  National  Space  Policy  Directive  of 6  September  1990  establishes  that  US 
Government satellites will be launched on US  manufactured launch vehicles unless 
a specific exemption has been granted by the President.  The measure is explained 
as part of a set of coordinated actions which are  required to  reach the long term 
goal  of creating  a  free  and  fair  market  in  which  the  US  launch  industry  can 
compete. 
The promotion of the  US  commercial space launch industry,  by  reserV'ing  ~II US 
launches of government satellites exclusively to domestic launch service suppliers, 
is  clearly  detrimental  to  European  launch  service .providers.  European  launch 
operators  are  effectively  barred  from  competing  for  US  government. launch 
· contracts, which account for  approximately 80 % of the  US  satellite market.  The· 
restriction, which is justified by the US  for national security reasons as regards the 
launching of military .satellites,  is  now also imposed on government satellites for 
civilian use Jo 
30  Report on United States Trade and Investment Barriers ( 1993) by  Services of the Commission of the European 
Communities- page 75 
36 Satellite  manufacturing  is  dominated  by  the  US  space  industry  which  takes 
benefit  of their  important  protected  domestic  civil  and  defense  markets  (see 
Annex 14). 
It is recognised that the  US  satellite services market is restricted as  regards entry 
by  European  satellite  service  providers,  in  the  sense  that  licences  may  not  be 
granted  to  operators  owned  by  foreign  governments  (e.g.  state-owned  telecom 
operators  and  broadcasters),  nor  to  suppliers  of broadcast,  common  carrier  or 
aeronautical services in cases where the foreign ownership exceeds 20% (or 25% 
indirectly). 
Regarding  mobile satellite services (MSS),  the  FCC  decision to  give  American 
Mobile Satellite Corporation (AMSC) the exclusive monopoly rights to  serve the 
domestic US market for these services means that any foreign competition, either at 
space  segment level  or at  service  level  is  excluded.  The  US  Court of Appeals 
reversed the FCC's decision to require several mobile satellite service applicants to 
join a  consortium  under  a  single  license.  However,  in  January  1992  the  FCC 
launched the process for a final decision granting the US monopoly mobile satellite 
service licence to AMSC. 
As far as aeronautical mobile satellite services are concerned, in  1989, the FCC 
confirmed its 1987 decision on the exclusivity of the AMSC licence and ruled that 
lnmarsat-based  aeronautical  satellite  services  may  not  be  used  on  the  domestic 
segments  of international  flights,  thereby  preventing  effective  market  entry  by 
Inmarsat-based  systems,  since  any  aircraft  in  flight  between  two  domestic  US 
points would be obliged to use AMSC space segment 31. 
Comments 
US manufacturers have a 69%  market share of  the ·worldwide commercial 
satellite  market.  The  US  Department  of Commerce  estimates  that  US 
exports in this area were about $ 600 million in  1991  compared with $ 643 
million in  1990,  and that imports were as little as $ 20. 000 in each of  those 
years !  It  is  worth  noting  that  Hughes  alone  has  approximately  38% 
worldwide  market  share  which  is  greater  than  all of Europe's  collective 
share (approximately 25%). 
This  market dominance  by US  manufacturers  is  a result of economies of 
scale and market power due to the overall size of  the commercial US market  •. 
but more  significantly,  to  the  size of  the  government civilian and military 
markets which are largely closed to non-US suppliers. 
6.  PATENT AND TRADEMARK APPLICATIONS (JAPAN) 
In recent years the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) has made progress in reducing the 
uncommonly  long  time  involved  in  the  processing  of patent  and  trademark 
31  Report on United States Trade and Investment Barriers ( 1993) by Services of the Commission of the European 
Communities - page 82 
37 applications.  Unfortunately,  however,  the  process  remains  one  of the  slowest 
among  developed  nations  when  coupled  with  the  practice  of  publishing  all 
applications.  This results in a long period of public access without legal protection 
of  the inventions. 
The problem is compounded by a number of  additional issues: 
- due  both  to  the  common  practice  in  Japan  of  filing  a  large  number  of 
applications to  cover slight variations in  known technology and  to  the  narrow 
interpretation  of patent  claims  by  Japanese  courts,  protection  is  effectively 
reduced and the system is overburdened with applications; 
- multiple oppositions after examination often introduce significant delays in  the 
patenting  process,  since  the  applicant  must  respond  to  each  opposition 
separately.  In  addition,  since  Japanese  law  contains  no  discovery  procedure 
whereby  the  owner  of a  process  patent  may  seek  evidence  of suspected 
infringement, the protection offered by a process patent is weakened; 
- Japan has a well-established trademark registration system.  However, as in the 
Japanese patent system, the  period of pendency, even in  uncontested cases,  is 
still unduly  long (about three years on average,  versus one  year or less in the 
United States); 
Despite the  recent enactment of the Trade  Secret Law,  there  is  still  a lack of 
effective protection for trade secret material during procedures in the courts 32• 
While the Japanese patent office has stated that it has reduced the pendency period 
from 37 months in 1988 to 28 months today, this refers only to one portion of the 
patent issuance process.  Total time submission of a patent application to granting 
of  a patent is usually five to six years, and it is much longer in many cases.33 
Comments 
The  publication  "Sub-committee  Report on Patent and Utility  Model Laws 
and  Their  Practices  Leading  to  International  Harmonisation"  by  an 
Advisory Council to the Ministry of  International Trade and Industry (MIT/) 
addresses this problem according to  the American Chamber of  Commerce. 
Its implementation should be closely monitored. 
Existence o.fBilateral and Multilateral Agreements 
Articles 35 to  38 of  the  Trips Agreement provide protection to  the  layout-
designs (topographies) of  integrated circuits. 
32  United States-Japan Trade White Paper 1993 by the American Chan1ber of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ) 
33  Section on Japan from the 1994 US  national trade estimate report on foreign trade barriers. page  161 
38 7.  PATENT ISSUES (UNITED STATES) 
7  .1.  Patents 
US patent law is based on the "first to invent system", with almost the rest of the 
world following the "first to file system".  Section 104 of the US Patent Law says 
that it is not possible to establish a date of  invention by reference to any activity in 
a  foreign  country.  A  non-US  inventor who  typically  carries  out  research  and 
development activities outside the US cannot therefore establish a date earlier than 
that in which he or she applied for the patent. 
This  treatment  clearly  discriminates  vis-a-vis  foreign  inventive  activities  in 
comparison to US domestic inventive activities and thus has the effect of forcing 
foreign companies to  carry out research and development in the  US  rather than 
abroad.  The discrimination features under Section 104 appear incompatible with 
Article  27 of the  Uruguay  round .Agreement on TRIPS.  The  US  will  have  to 
undertake the necessary modifications. 
7.2.  Government use 
US law allows governmental use of intellectual property rights without even having 
to notify the right holder.  This practice is particularly frequent in the activities of 
the  Department  of Defense.  For  obvious  reasons  this  practice  is  particularly 
detrimental  for  foreign  right  holders because they will  generally  not  be able  to 
detect such government use and are thus likely to miss the opportunity to initiate an 
administrative claims procedure.  The TRIPS Agreement contains some safeguards 
for the patent holder which should eventually lead to considerable changes in the 
US law and practices on mandatory licensing. 
7.3.  Section 337 of  Tariff Act 1930. 
Sec. 337 of the US  Tariff Act provides among others remedies for holders of US 
patents with a view to keeping imported goods infringing such patents out of the 
US (exclusion order) or to get them out of  the US market once they have come into 
the country (cease and desist order). 
These procedures are carried out by the US International Trade Commission (lTC) 
and are not available against domestic products infringing US patents. 
In July 1987 the European Community requested the establishment of a panel to 
consider the compatibility of  Sec. 337 of  the US Tariff Act with the US' obligations 
under the GATT notably with its Article III. 
The Panel Report which was adopted by the Contracting Parties on 7 November 
1989 established the existence of a number of inconsistencies with US obligations 
under article III of  the Agreement34 
34Report on United States barriers to trade and investment, 1994, page 61 
39 Comments 
Despite the GAIT Panel finding of  1989 the  US have to  date  not taken any 
measure to bring Sec.  337 in line with its international obligations under the 
GATT. 
The  chilling  effects of Sec.  337  on  European  companies' activities  were 
highlighted in  1992 by several cases.  whereby the discriminatory character 
became particularly apparent  in  one  case  where  the federal  district court 
had stayed the procedure before it  on the ground of  an arbitration clause, 
which  did not prevent the  lTC which  was  subsequently petitioned to  take 
action.  In  1992  Senator  Rockefeller introduced a  bill into  the  US  Senate 
which was intended to bring Sec.  337 in line with the  GATT panel findings. 
While  the  bill addresses  indeed some of  the  issues addressed in  the panel 
findings  it clearly falls short of remedying the  GATT inconsistencies in  a 
meaningful manner. 
40 V.  STRUCTURALIMPEDIMENTS 
The Community's objective is to remove all barriers which objectively block access 
for Community companies to the Japanese and US markets. 
1.  ACCESS TO TECtiNOLOGY IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR FIELD (JAPAN) 
The  intricate  types  of association  among  Japanese  firms  and  the  strong  links 
between business and public administration make it easy to  ensure that Japanese 
firms have a systematic preferential access to technology developed in Japan. 
Difficulties have been allegedly experienced in the timely access to state-of-the-art 
materials,  processes  and  equipment  newly  developed  by  Japanese  suppliers, 
necessary  to  develop  and  produce  the  most  advanced  generations  of  the 
(semiconductor)  technology  supporting  the  most  advanced  electronic  equipment 
and  products.  The  report  by  Lloyd  Bentsen  on  US  business  access  to  certain 
foreign  state-of-the-art  technology  has  outlined  the  problem  from  the  US 
perspective.Js 
Difficulties  are  also  experienced  in the  access  to  the  highest  quality  materials, 
processes and equipment necessary to develop the most advanced and to  produce 
with highest quality  the  generations  of the  technology  supporting  the  advanced 
electronic  equipment  and  products  (in  semiconductor  this  often  relates  to 
production with lower cost). 
Some examples: 
Photo lithographic equipment e.g.  Canon, for  the production of semiconductors, 
defining the line width of the  lines  on the  silicon, which is  the  main factor  for 
improved performances and  increased density,  is  first  introduced  in the  internal 
market  of Japan.  European  firms  trying  to  access  this  crucial. equipment  for 
introducing their next generation of technology are offered this equipment 1 to  1.5 
years later and face long delivery times resulting in delays in entering the market, 
higher costs, longer learning curves.  Basically this delay is encountered while all 
development of these types of new equipment is  done in combination with local 
customers and only released after full qualification. 
Photo  lithographic  equipment for  the  production of flat .  panels  follow  the  same 
pattern. 
Japanese  suppliers  are  generally  presenting  engineering  samples of components 
several (10-18) months in advance to their preferred (Japanese) customers, which 
allow  these  customers  to  use  this  advantage  in  more  up  to  date  electronic 
equipment.  Typically  Europe  is  a  half generation  behind  Japan  for  electronic 
equipment. 
3S  "US business access to certain foreign state-of-the-art technology" september 1991 
41 Some advanced materials e.g. sputtering material for advanced deposition and e.g. 
high quality resist  materials  for  advanced photolithographic  processing arc  today 
not available in Europe and are delivered with major delays and in small quantities. 
This is  delaying the  learning curve related  with the  production ramp-up of semi-
conductor processing.  Some gases and chemicals are not delivered with the highest 
quality  available  (liquid  source  chemicals,  gases  for  deposition)  resulting  in 
decreased quality and yielding loss in the processing (higher cost). 
Packaging of  components are using plastic packaging material of high quality.  The 
most advanced  materials  (e.g.  Sumitomo) are  delivered  much  later  to  European 
companies  and  initially  only  in  small  quantities.  This  results  in  a  delay  in 
reliability improvements and yield loss.  The same with ceramic substrates and high 
quality  spin-on  glass  for  planarisation  used  in  the  fabrication  process  of semi-
conductors. 
Comments 
The  US market is served before Europe.  The delay can he from 1 to 2 years. 
Japanese  suppliers,  by systematically servinR their  own  market before  the 
US  and Europe,  influence  the  early introduction of new products putting 
European companies at a disadvantage even to  compete in  their own home 
market. 
This,  systematically serving the home market earlier and with higher quality 
supporting  materials,  processes  and  equipment  for  the  manufacturing, 
influences  the  ultimate  quality  of the  product.  the  initial  cost  and the 
progress of  the learning curve in manufacturing. 
The Act concerning prohibition ofprivate monopoly and maintenance of  fair 
trade prohibits in particular the unreasonable restraint of  trade.  This  term 
means  "that  any  entrepreneur,  by  contract,  agreement  or  any  other 
concerted  actions,  irrespective  of the  names.  with  other  entrepreneurs, 
mutually restrict or conduct their business activities in  such a manner as tv 
fix,  maintain,  or  increase  prices,  or  to  limit  production,  technology. 
products, facilities,  or customers or suppliers,  thereby restraining,  contrary 
to  the  public interest,  substantially competition  in  an.v  particular field of 
trade.  The same Act provides that no trade associations shall engage in acts 
"causing  entrepreneurs  to  employ  such  acts  as  constitute  unfair  trade 
practices".  Concerted refusal to  deal and other njusal to  deal fall within 
the  definition  of unfair  trade  practices 36.  On  the  contrary,  thcrr  is  no 
provision concerning the delayed refusal to deal. 
Two Community companies manufacturing semiconductor  tahrication equipment 
are attempting to  commence trading  in  Japan with  their latest products  and  they 
view that market as crucial to support their business level. 
36  Japanese Competition Law by the Fair frade Commission of Japan- Septembn I  'JY I 
42 Comments 
The  world-wide  market  for  integrated  circuit  production  equipment  is 
currently  at  6B$  and forecast  to  rise  to  9. 3B$  by  1996.  Besides  this 
commercial consideration,  it is more important to appreciate the impact of 
such  equipment  arising  from  its  capability  to  manufacture  advanced 
intergrated  circuits,  which  is  dependent  on  its  level  of technological 
development.  In an industry which has technology upgrades every three to 
five years, the equipment manufacturers' ability to offer the latest technology 
is  dependant  on  very  high  R&D  expenditures  - typically  15%  to  20%. 
Failing to  invest will result in not outperforming the competition and then 
resulting in an insufficient market share to survive. 
Since  the  money for  R&D  comes from  volume  sales,  and the  endemic 
European  IC manufacturers  do  not represent  sufficient  market size  then 
European equipment companies must look to areas such as Japan for volume 
sales.  The  single market has encouraged foreign  manufacturers to  set up 
factories in Europe,  but to sell equipment to Japanese companies here,  it is 
first necessary to sell in Japan.  However,  European IC manufacturers need 
advanced production tools available locally,  to  ensure that they are in time 
to market advanced microelectronics 
2.  ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR FIELD (UNITED STATES) 
Semiconductor equipment in the US  is developed in the framework of Sematech, 
the  semi-conductor programme  in  the  US,  which  is  using  only  local  suppliers. 
Consequently there is a delayed access to the most advanced equipment.  European 
producers established in the US  have so far not been able to directly participate to 
Sematech programmes.  However, US producers with R&D facilities established in 
Europe are able to participate and receive support in Commimity and Eureka (Jessi) 
activities 
Comments 
JESSI have established an arms-length frame for cooperation with Sematech 
including workshops for exchange of  information,  but so far this has be~n 
limited in  scope  to  the  involvement of  European  equipment and material 
(E&M) producers.  However,  this is .viewed as important from the European 
perspective since the  European market size alone is not sufficient to  allow. 
viable development of  advanced technologies.  The  best way to sell offshore 
in the E&M business is to collaborate at an early stage of  development with 
the prospective customers.  The  limited existing cooperation  is,  therefore, 
valuable  to  Europeans  as  it  gives  them  access  to  the  "club"  of US  IC 
producers who are key customers.  At present joint working is also difficult 
due  to  differences  in  the  legal status and structure of  JESSI (cooperation 
agreement status) and Sematech (legal entity).  Direct transatlantic strategic 
alliances  have  been  established on  essentially  commercial grounds  (e.g. 
Siemens/IBM alliances on 64 Mbit and 256 Mbit memories). 
43 Vice-President Gore has announced at the  he~inning of  March  1994 a new 
government-industry  partnership  to  strengthen  America's  leadership  in 
semiconductors. 
The  goal  of this  initiative  is  tv  assist  the  US  industry  to  develop  the 
semiconductors  technology  for  the  next  15  years,  on  the  basis  of a 
"roadmap"  of the  long-term  technology  requirements  of the  industry, 
developed earlier by expert in industry, government and Academia. 
To  this end the  Department of  Commerce through the  National Institute of 
Science  and  Technology  will  establish  a  National  Semiconductor 
Methodology programme.  The  Department of Defense  will sponsor  high 
priority research on  electronic packaging and will continue to  support the 
efforts ofSematech.  The  Department of  Energy will establish a Center on a 
cost-shared  basis  with  industry,  for  the  simulation  and  modelling  of 
semiconductor materials,  manufacturing processes  and chip  design  The 
National Science Foundation will continue to invest in long-term research 
This initiative, in principle,  will not involve additional funding for R&D,  but 
rather represents a shift in priorities.  To  this  end the  administration  will 
establish  later  in  the  year  1994  a  Semiconductor  Technology  Council 
composed of  top government officials, senior industry executives and leading 
academicians. 
3.  STANDARDS SETTING (UNITED STATES) 
The EC continues to be  concerned about certain developments taking place in  the 
United States  because of: 
- standards for Telecommunications services  being developed  independently of 
national and international standardisation procedures; 
- the  high  cost  of  adapting  European-based  switching  equipment  to  US 
specifications; 
- the existence of voluntary standards for terminal equipme~t which are "de facto 
mandatory"; 
the  attempt  by  the  FCC  to  enforce  a  standard  in  the  area  of  mobile 
communications  which  is  incompatible  with  the  Digital  European  Cordless 
Technology  (DECT),  system  for  which  Technical  Bases  for  Regulations 
(TBRs) under Directive 91/263/EEC has recently been finalized. 
44 Comments 
Standards are strategic in terms of  controlling the further flow of  products. 
The  standards of the  US  telecoms  network are  completely different from 
those in Europe. 
Before any telecommunications equipment can be sold in the US.,  it must be 
approved  by  Bel/core,  US.  largest  research  consortium  which  performs 
technical work for its shareholders,  the seven Regional Holding Companies 
(RHCs),  in  five  major  areas :  applied  research,  operations  technology, 
software  technology  and systems,  network  technology,  and  information 
networking  services.  The  process for  EC  producers  of adapting  their 
products  to  US.  standards  and  of gaining  such  "type  approval" for 
equipment in combination with the tendering process makes securing orders 
difficult.  In  addition,  the  expense  of testing  certain  network equipment 
through Bel/core can be very high in some cases, so that although the system 
is open to all in theory,  in practice it is open only to those suppliers with the 
ability to make this investment. 
Although  officially  FCC  requirements  are  the  only  mandatory  standards 
imported terminals  have  to  meet,  exporters have  no  certainty as  to  which 
other standards will  in practice need to  be  complied with  in  order to  sell 
their products.  The multiplicity of  "voluntary" standards and the absence of 
a central point where information on all relevant standards can be obtained 
represents an effective trade barrier. 
In  the  area of  mobile communications the  FCC has taken a stand against 
promoting internationally compatible  standards.  Under  pressure from  a 
national industry grouping,  the FCC is in the process of  creating a technical 
barrier to trade against European DECT systems. 
Existence ofbilateral or multilateral agreements 
Negotiations  are  being  pursued with  the  US for  the  mutual  recognition 
agreement of  conformity assessment of  terminal equipment. 
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46 FINANCIAL PENALTIES FOR ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES I~  JAPA~ 
-SOME EXAMPLES-
ANNEX 1 
In February 1992, Japan's Fair Trade Commission asked prosecutors to file charges in the 
case against four printing companies i.e.  Tappan Moore,  Hitachi  Infonnation Systems, 
Dai-Nippon Printing Co.  and  Kobayashi  Kirokushi  Co.  According  to  the  Fair Trade 
Commission, at a meeting in late April 1992 at a Tokyo branch of Kobayashi Kirokushi, 
ti'le  four  decided to  allow one  among  them  to  win  a contract and sub-contract to  the 
others. 
On 30 March 1993, in the first convictions in nearly two decades under Japan's anti-trust 
legislation, two former officers of two printing companies were found guilty on charges 
of bid-rigging.  The Tokyo District Court gave a former officer of Tappan Moore Co. a 
one-year  suspended  prison  sentence  and  three  years  probation.  A  former  officer  of 
Hitachi Information Systems Ltd.  received  an  18-rnonth suspended sentence and  three 
years probation.  The convictions were the first of their kind since  1974.  They carne as 
Washington  is  pressing Tokyo  to  step  up  the  fight  against  the  price  cartels and  other 
monopolistic practices that the United States considers barriers to  imports.  Prosecutors 
arrested  14  officers including the 2 sentenced, at  5 printing companies in  October and 
November, 1992.  They were suspected of illegally fixing prices on the  coded seals the 
Social Insurance Agency affixes to  post card identifications of pension payments.  The 
cases of the other 12 officials are still pending. 
On Friday, 21  May  1993  in  a conclusion to  a closely watched anti-trust case, a Tokyo 
court found  eight companies  guilty of fixing  prices of plastic  film  used  for  wrapping 
food.  The companies were given fines of between 6 million and 8 million yen, or about 
$ 54,000  to  $ 73.000.  Fifteen  executives  of the  companies  were  given  suspended 
sentences of six months to one year in  prison.  Some of the eight food-wrap companies 
did not deny price fixing  but argued in court that it  would be  unfair to  single them out 
since there were so many other more serious examples of price fixing in Japan. 
Source: Commission's services 
1 AT  & T's  POSITION ON THE US MARKET 
ANNEX2 
It is instructive to contrast AT  &T's position v.ith that of  companies in the more dynamic 
segments of the U.S. telecommunication market, where EC suppliers are afforded a fair 
opportunity to compete.  In those dynamic market segments, for example the supply of 
switches, mobile communications, and transmission products to  the  U.S.  independent 
telephone  companies,  EC  suppliers  have  been  more  successful  in  obtaining  orders. 
Nonetheless, taking the U.S.  switch market as a  whole,  the recent  independent study 
demonstrates  that  two  North  American  companies,  AT&T  and  Northern  Telecom, 
supplied respectively 44% and 40% of the U.S. central office switching market in 1990 
and that virtually all  switches sold in the  U.S.  are manufactured  in North  America 1. 
From the same study, one can also derive the average price per line for AT&T on the one 
hand and the other IXC's (MCI, Sprint, other smaller long distance carriers) on the other 
hand.  The resulting prices are the following: 
1989  1990 
AT  &Ts : price per line (S)  1073  745 
Other IXCs : price per line (S)  565  601 
It seems therefore that the price at which AT&T buys its switching equipment from itself 
is actually higher than the purchase price the other IXC's get from competitors of  AT&T. 
This is in line with the existence of  the monopoly and contradicts the repeated US official 
statement  that  there  cannot  be  any  bias  resulting  from  the  self-dealing  practices  of 
AT&T. 
AT&T share which climbed to about 4 7% in  1992 is expected to grow to about 50% of a 
$6 billion market by the end of 1993 while Northern's share would sink to 33%. 
Northern Business Information Inc.,  a New York research firm,  plans to  increase that 
share further to 60% within a couple of years.  AT&T network systems has put further 
distance between itself and foreign entrants such as Siemens and  Ericson;  At the same 
time the upturn also owes much to the troubles at Northern Telecom.· 
Northern Business Information (Nnt). MCentral Office: Equipment PurchasesM, a rc:pon prepared for The: Office 
of  the: U.S. Trade: Rc:prc:sc:ntativc:  Executive: Office of the: President, Me Graw Hill. 20 \larch 1992. 
2 US Public Network Digital Switch Market 
1993  1992 
($6 billion)  ($5.2 billion) 
AT&T  50%  47% 
Northern Telecom  33%  35% 
Siemens Stromberg  6%  6% 
GTE•  5%  6% 
LM Ericsson  5%  5% 
DSC  I%  1% 
--
•Equipment Umt 50% owned by AT&T 
3 MODIFICATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT FOR THE RBOC's 
ANNEX3 
The Chairmen of  the House Energy and Commerce Committee (Dingell) and the House 
Judiciary  Committee  (Brooks)  have  reached  agreement  on  a  bill  (H.R.  3626)  which 
would phase out the limitations contained in the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) 
which  prevent  the  RBOCs  from  engaging  in  long-distance  telephony  services  and 
manufacturing.  The bill will be the subject of  hearings in 1994. 
The bill would allow an RBOC, within one year of  enactment, to submit an application to 
the Justice Deptartment to  engage in manufacturing.  The Justice  Dept.  will  have to 
determine "whether there is no possibility that such company or its affiliate could use 
monopoly power to impede competition in the market such company seeks to enter". 
If,  within the  following  year,  the Attorney  General  fails  to enjoin the company from 
going forward with its plans, the RBOC will be free to engage in manufacturing, subject 
to certain safeguards: 
separate subsidiary requirements; 
separate books, records and accounts; 
obligation to sell equipment to other carriers on non-discriminatory terms, provided 
such carriers do not manufacture telecom equipment, or provided they agree to make 
available telecom equipment which they manufacture; 
filing of  information on protocols and interconnection requirements with the FCC; 
no cross subsidization. 
The  bill  does  not  contain any  requirements  that the  RBOCs procure equipment  in a 
transparent and non-discriminatory manner (a request made by the Telecommunications 
Industry Association with respect to previous bills). 
The RBOCs must conduct all manufacturing in the US and, like the old "Hollings Bill", 
they  may  use  foreign  components  only  if they  make  "a  good  faith  effort  to  obtain 
equivalent components in the US at reasonable prices, terms and conditions", and if the 
cost of foreign components does not exceed 40% of the sales revenues derived in any 
calendar year from  such equipment.  The  RBOCs must also certify to  the FCC on a 
quartely basis that they have made good faith efforts to obtain parts in the US and they 
must list foreign components.  Failure to  do so would entail the imposition of penalties 
by the FCC.  Also, any supplier claiming to be damaged because of a RBOC's failure to 
make  the  good  faith  effort  may  make  complaint  to  the  Federal  Communications 
Commission or may bring suit for the recovery of actual damage in any district court of 
the United States of  competent jurisdiction. 
Also,  the  Chairman  of the  House  Energy  Subcommittee  on  Telecom  (Markey)  has 
succeeded to  craft, with bi-partisan support, a bill allowing RBOCs' entry into cable in  · 
their area of telephone service and (as a quid pro quo) competition in the local network. 
The  bill  (H.R.  3636),  "the  National  Communications  Competition  and  Information 
Infrastructure Act of 1993", will be the subject ofhearing in 1994. 
4 The bill, which aims at promoting competition and preserving universal service, would: 
repeal the cable-telco cross-ownership rules; 
prohibit telcos from buying cable systems within their service areas; 
create  a  Federal-State  Joint  Board  to  ensure  universal  service  by  requmng  all 
providers to contribute to universal service; 
require the FCC to review how the concept of universal service should be expanded 
to include provisions of "digital service" (digital service means making available to 
residential  consumers,  at  reasonalbe  cost,  digital  compression  capability). 
Specifically,  the  FCC  must  investigate  the  policy  changes  necessary  to  provide 
"open Platform  Service"  ("Open  Platform  Service"  means  a  switched  end-to-end 
digital  telecom  service,  which  1)  provides  subscribers  with  sufficient  network 
capability  to  access  multimedia  information  services,  2)  is  widely  available 
throughout  each  State,  3)  is  provided  based  on  accepted  standards,  and  4)  is 
available to all customers on a single line basis upon resonable request); 
preempt State laws prohibiting entry into local telephone networks, 
require telcos to set up separate subsidiaries for video programming services, and 
require local  phone companies  to  provide  equal  access  to  and  interconnection 
with their network. 
The administration will work with Congress to pass legislation by  the end of 1994 that 
will  increase  competition  and  ensure  universal  access  in  communications  markets; 
particularly those,  such as  the  cable  television and  local  telephone  markets,  that have 
been dominated by monopolies.  Such legislation will explicitly promote private sector 
infrastructure investment, both  by  companies already  in  the  market  and  those  seeking 
entry. 
The US administration is hoping to  influence events by reducing the regulatory barriers 
that have prevented competition between telephone and cable television companies.  The 
US  administration  also  wants  to  promote  standards  that  allow  different  networks  to 
communicate with each other and gently prod the  players to think about the broad public 
interest.  The  administration  will  propose  that  companies  providing  a  wide  array  of 
switched, broadband digital services be only lightly regulated by the FCC (a new title VII 
of the  communications  act)  in exchange  for  providing  services  and  access  to  their 
facilites by others on a non-discriminatory basis. 
The decision taken in  February  1994  by  the· Federal  Communications Cornmisston  to 
lower the cable rates ·have made unlikely that the cable industry could generate the cash 
flow expected.  Consequently two partnership between a telephone company and a cable-
TV company have collapsed, i.e.  the  partnership  between Southwestern Bell  Corp and 
Cox Cable Communications, Bell Atlantic Corp. and Tele-communications Inc. 
On  Friday  26  August  1994  a  Federal  appeals  court  ruled  that  telephone  companies 
seeking to provide cable services over their lines do not need to obtain costly franchises 
from  local  goven:unents.  The  decision  which  affirms  federal  communications 
c.ommission policy, was a setback to the cable industry.  The cable industry, which pays 
s local governments millions of dollars annually in  franchise fees,  has appealed the FCC's 
three year old policy, saying it put cable operators at disadvantage. 
These two decisions have led to a reshuffle of the cards and it now appears that the two 
industries i.e. telephone and cable are direct competitors.  Accordingly Walt Disney Co. 
and three regional companies, Arneritech Corp, Bell South Corp and Southwestern Bell 
Corp.  announced  Monday  8  August  1994  that  they  had  signed  a  Memorandum  of 
understanding to  fonn a joint venture to develop intereactive video  services.  Services 
could ultimately include existing broadcasting and satellite televison networks as well as 
movies  on  demand,  home  shoppping,  educational  programmes,  games  and  travel 
assistance.  Arnerictch,  Bellsouth and  Southewestem Bell provide telecommunications 
services to about 50 million customers lines in  19 States. 
At  the  same  time  four  of the  largest  US  cable  television  companies  announced  on 
Tuesday 9 August 1994 that they would spend more than $2  billion for equipment this 
Autwnn  in  an  effort  to  offer  "one-stop"  telecommunications  services  to  consumers. 
Chief  Executive  of  Cox  Cable  communications  inc,  Continental  Cablevision  inc, 
Comcast Corp.  and  Tele-Communications  Inc.  said  they  each  intended  to  offer high-
definition television, wireless telephone, video on demand basic telephone and computer 
on-line services.  The  upgrades  to  their networks will  allow them to  compete directly 
with  the  seven  regional  Bell  operating  companies  in  the  $90  Billion  a  year  local 
telephone market. 
Source: Commission's services 
6 NEW COMPETITIVE: TRENDS IN THE lJS TELECOM MARKET 
ANNEX 4 
The regulatory framework of the Modified Final Judgement is  increasingly rocked to its 
very foundations by the new competitive trends that permeate the US  market and which 
are likely to bring radical change. 
The monopolies enjoyed by  the local  industry, which comprises seven so-called "Baby 
Bell" regional companies and a host of independents are beginning to break room thanks 
to  the  new  technologies  of high-capacity  fibre  optic  cable,  digital  compression  and 
cellphones.  New competitors are starting to eat into the phone companies' most lucrative 
existing businesses, and threaten to  take  a  large  slice of promising  new ones such as 
interactive video to the home. 
On the one hand the RBOCs face  a  looming  end  to  their monopolies  because of the 
emerging competition of  cable television and try to react and reap the benefits of  the new 
business opportunities by getting rid of the interdictions foreseen  in  the Modified Final 
Judgement,  where  they  were  barred  from  entering  three  markets  i.e.  long-distance, 
equipment manufacturing and  information services.  After a  long campaign, the  Baby 
Bells managed to get the information services ban removed in 1991  and their request has 
been eventually upheld by the Supreme Court and they are pressing to  be  allowed into 
the two other businesses on the grounds that they now face significant local competition. 
Ameritech Corp. is pushing a plan to enter the long distance market in a trial as early as 
1995, sparking loud objections from AT&T and the two other major rivals in the market: 
MCI Communications Corp. and Sprint Corp.  Opponents have argued that the baby bells 
shouldn't  be  allowed  in  long distance  because  they  enjoy a  monopoly  in  local  phone 
services.  Ameritech has sought to sidested that argument by offering to surrender its own 
monopoly rights.  The Chicago based Bell company told  US  regulators it  would throw 
open its local calling market to all comers in exchange for the right to offer long-distance 
services in the five States it serves. 
On the other hand, AT&T and the other long-distance carriers are  urging that the  local 
market be opened to greater competition in the hope that this will cut access charges and 
spur traffic growth.  They, in particular, resent the high charges they have to pay the local 
telephone companies to carry calls over the last mile or two of wire to customers.  lbese 
"access charges" bear little relation to  the cost of providing the  service, yet account for 
about  30% of local  operations'  revenues  and  are  the  largest  single  expense  for  long-
distance groups (about 40% of  the total cost of  a long-distance call). 
MCI Conununications Corp. intends to challenge regional Bell monopolies in at  lqst 20 
major US  cities, including New York and  Los  Angeles,  for  the  right  to  provide  local 
conununication  services  and  to  spend  $20  billion  on  the  electronic  equivalent  of 
widening,  paving  and  building  access  ramps,  for  its  idea  of  a  lJS  information 
superhighway.  If successful, the bid for local service would give MCI, which is already 
the primary competitor of the long-distance leader AT&T, an opportunity to  carry a full 
range  of  communication  and  entertainment  products  directly  to  consumers  and 
businesses, with business as the initial target. 
7 Also, there has been a rapid growth of the  cellular telephone industry, which offers an 
alternative means of communication to the local phone companies' network.  The Baby 
Bells are among the leading players in this business but  by acquiring McCaw Cellular 
Communications Inc.,  the  US's  largest cellular phone company, AT&T plans to  get  a 
foothold in the local market, as well as another potential means of by-passing the Baby 
Bells' access charges.  Mr. Allen, AT  &T's president, recently declared that cellular is "an 
exploding  market"  and  such  wireless  services  combined  with  pocket  communicators 
"will make anywhere, any time, communications a reality". 
On Monday 28 February 1994, MCI Communications Corp announced it was spending 
$1.3 billion for a  17% stake in Nextel Communications Inc.  in an effort to provide the 
first nationwide wireless personal communications services later in the year:  MCI  and 
Nextel  will  form  a  "strategic alliance"  with  Comcast Corp which also  holds  17% of 
Nextel.  The agreement will allow the three companies to provide wireless voice and data 
service to 95% of the US  population.  It will also allow users to have one nwnber for 
their office, home and mobile telephone. 
The group will  use  equipme~t made by  Motorola  Inc;  Nextel  offered  a  20% stake to 
Motorola in November 1993 in exchange for mobile radio licences.  Nextel's Network is 
digital  rather  than  analog,  which  means  customers  will  have  to  use  a  sophisticated 
telephone made by Motorola to take advantage of  the system. 
Finally,  state  and  federal  regulators  have  allowed  new  local  telecommunications 
companies, known as "competitive access providers" (CAPs), to establish themselves in 
many metropolitan areas, where they operate highly efficient fibre optic networks.  They 
cream off some of the local monopolies' most profitable business customers by offering 
cheaper rates to transmit their bulk traffic around the area and directly into networks run 
by long-distance carriers. 
But apart from the individual strides to best position itself in order to take advantage of 
the new business opportunities, a new cooperation trend is taking shape as multimedia's 
emphasis on  integration flies in the face of  the administrative breakup of  communications 
services such as that embodied in the 1982 court order. 
For a  while it seemed that  telecom operators and  cable TV  owners  would  be  natural 
competitors, each of them  trying a  technical  or legal  way  to  step into the other one's 
kingdom.  Recently,  however,  both  entities  have  realized  that  it  is  to  their common 
advantage to cooperate.  Through such associations, telecom operators may hope to get 
around the many limitations ruled by Judge Green when setting up  Baby Bells (1984) 
while cable operators acquire  the  funds  needed in  order to  build  up  the  "information 
highways". 
Each Baby Bell can see its local-exchange monopoly coming under increasing pressure 
from  cellular  companies,  private-line  operators  and  nimble  interniediaries  offering 
customers  alternative  ways  to  reach  long-distance  operators.  The  growth  of c~ble 
networks is even more of  a threat.  The 1992 Cable Act bans the Baby Bells from taking 
a stake in cable networks in their monopoly areas.  They can, however, invest in others 
that  operate  in  other Bell  franchises.  By  developing telephone  services  via  the  data 
highway, they might be able to expand in each other's markets.  Accordingly Pacific Bell 
has sought to offer customers on the  East coast around Washington a "video dial tone" 
8 that would bring a wide choice of video services into their homes and offices on request. 
Any local telephone company that can \\ire a house and produce that kind of dial  tone 
has the opportunity to dominate its market. 
Other Baby  Bells have  hooked  up  with  cable  companies  to  ugrade  their  systems  for 
entertainement,  interactive  television,  home  shopping,  access  to  data  bases  and  other 
telecommunications advances.  Bell  Atlantic  has  agreed  to  buy  Tele-Communications 
Inc., America's top cable company; US  West Inc. has invested in Time Warner Inc. and 
intends  to  buy  two  Atlanta-area  cable  TV  companies;  Nynex  Corp.  has  invested  in 
Viacom Inc; Bell South is expected to join with QVC Inc., the home shopping network; 
South Western Bell and Cox plan a cable partnership. 
For  one  thing  cable  companies  are  ahead  on  certain  technologies,  such  as  digital 
compression.  On the other hand, the Federal  Communications Commission (FCC) has 
served notice that it is going to treat cable fmns under the terms of the  1992 Cable Act, 
more or less as it treats telephone companies, that is with vigilance.  Price cuts of 10% on 
basic cable services are already being imposed.  Cable bosses once sought to keep the 
Baby Bells out of their industry fearing  the  telephone firms  would  use  local-exchange 
profits to cross-subsidize cable subsidiaries unfairly.  Now they are keen to get in on any 
subsidization themselves. 
A  Federal  District judge  in  Alexandria,  Virginia,  declared  unconstitutional,  on  first 
amendment  grounds,  a  provision  of the  1984  Cable  Act  that  prevents  telephone 
companies from selling video programming to subscribers in their own telephone service 
area.  If the  ruling  by judge T.S.  Ellis  is  upheld  in  appeal,  it  would  give  telephone 
companies an incentive to spend billions of dollars building new fiber-optic networks to 
provide both telephone and video services.  The cable ·industry has argued that allowing 
telephone companies to sell programming would be dangerous, because they could use 
their monopoly over telephone service to subsidize low rates for video services. 
Furthermore in order to reduce the cost for consumers and to stimulate the competition of 
new technologies, the Attorney General of the State of New York has announced at the 
beginning of June 1993 that seven cable companies, i.e. Teleconununications Inc. (TCI), 
Time Warner as well  as Newhouse, Cox,  Continental,  Comcast,  Viacom and  the joint 
venture  Primestar  Partners  between  the  seven  and  General  Electric  on  satellite 
communication, had agreed to  allow an  equal  access to  cable television programmes to 
operators using technologies different from the cable.  This is intended. to allow operators 
using any other technology  but  cable.  i.e.  microwave  or telephony,  to  gain access  to 
entertainment or news programmes at  competitive  prices.  AT&T  is  presently  talking 
with US cable companies about linking their customers into one big multimedia network. 
American Telephone &  Telegraph Co  h3.S  urged·the Government to allow it to  compete 
for long-distance customers on the same terms as  its competitors do  within and outside 
the  United  States.  The  company  said  that  the  Federal  Communication  Commission 
should end the designation of AT&T as a "dominant carrier" that requires it to  notify the 
government in advance of  deploying ne'' services. 
On Thursday,  23  September  1993,  the  Federal  Communications Commission  adopted 
rules that v.:ill  create two to six new  v.~rdess networks in every American city and to\vn. 
In what the  communications industry considers a landmark decision, the  FCC  by  a 2-1 
9 vote,  designated  160  megahertz of spectrum  for  the  new services,  a.,  amount  that  far 
outstrips the band with alloted to the now booming cellular industry. 
The new wireless technology will take cellular telephones into the next centUI)', allowing 
voice. paging and computer communications to be linked by radio waves rather than the 
age old traditional copper telephone wires. It will be more powerful than current cellular 
technology, a hybrid of  radio waves and traditional land wires, and open up a new area of 
competition in mobile communications.  The technology is expected to fuel a revolution 
in mobile pocket-sized phones, making it possible for customers to have one telephone 
number to reach them wherever they are. 
Source: Commission's services 
10 COMM~NIT\'  LAW FOR PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
ANNEX 5 
Under  article  9.1  of the  Council  Directive  of  22 March  1988  amending  directive 
77/62/EEC  relating  to  the  coordination  of procedures  on the  award  of public  supply 
contracts and repealing certain provisions of Directive 80/67/EEC: 
1.  The contracting authorities listed  in Annex  1 to  Directive 801767/EEC shall  make 
known, as  from  1 January  1989,  as  soon  as  possible  after  the beginning of their 
budgetary year, by means of an indicative notice, the total procurement by product 
area of  which the estimated value, taking into account the provisions of Article 5 of 
this  Directive,  is  equal  or  greater  than  750.000  ECU  and  which  they  envisage 
awarding during the coming 12 months. 
2.  Contracting  authorities  who  wish  to  award  a  public  supply  contract  by  open, 
restricted or, under the conditions laid down in Article 6 (3 ), by negotiated procedure 
within the  meaning of Article  1 shall  make  kno·wn  their intention  by  means of a 
notice. 
Under article 6.e of the Council Directive of 21  December 1976 coordinating procedures 
for the award of public supply contracts, contracting authorities may award their supply 
contracts  by  negotiated  procedure  without  prior  publication  of a  tender  notice.  "For 
additional  deliveries  by  the  original  supplier  which  are  intended  either  as  part 
replacement of  normal supplies or installations. or as the ex"lension of existing supplies or 
installations  where  a  change  of supplier  would  compel  the  contracting  authority  to 
purchase  equipment  having  different  technical  characteristics  which  could  result  in 
incompatibility  or disproportionate  technical  difficulties  of operation  or  maintenance. 
The length of such contracts as well as that of recurrent contracts may, as a general rule, 
not exceed three years". 
Under article 7.2 of Council Directive of 21  December 1976 coordinating procedures for 
the award of public supply contracts : 
"2.  Unless such specifications are justified by the subject of the contract. Member States 
shall prohibit the introduction into the contractual clauses relating to a given contract 
of technical specifications which mention goods of a specific make or source or of a 
particular process  and  which  have  the  effect  of favouring  or eliminating  certain 
undertakings or products.  In particular, the indication of trade marks, patents, types 
or specific origin or productions  shall  be  prohibited:  however.  such  an  indication 
accompanied by the words "or equivalent" shall be authorized where the subject of 
the contract canpot otherwise be  described by  specifications v.:hich  are sufficiently 
precise and fully intelligible to all concerned." 
Source: Commission's services 
11 THE US HPCC PROGRAMME 
ANNEX 6 
The HPCC programme comprises four sub-programmes of  which one,  the NREN,  is 
specifically focussed on networking.  The sub-programmes are: 
- High  Performance  Computing  Systems  (HPCS)  - the  development  of the 
underlying technology required  for scalable high performance computing systems 
capable  of sustaining  trillions  of operations  per second on  large  problems. 
Research in  very high performance systems is focusing both on  increasing the 
absolute level of  performance attainable and on reducing the  cost and size of 
these ·very high performance  systems  in  order  to  make  them  accessible  to a 
broader range of  applications. 
- Advanced Software  Technology  and Algorithms  (ASTA)  - the  development  of 
generic software  technology and algorithms  and the  deployment  of the  most 
innovative  systems for  Grand Challenge  research  application  in  a  networked 
environment. 
- National  R~search and Education  Network  (NREN)  - the  development  of a 
national  high  speed network  to  provide  distributed  computing  capability  to 
research and educational institutions and to further advanced research on very 
high speed networks and applications. 
- Basic  Research  and  Human  Resources  (BRHR)  - support  for  individual 
investigator  and  multidisciplinary  long  term  research  drawn  from  diverse 
disciplines,  including  computer  science,  computer  engineering,  and 
computational science  and engineering;  initiation of activities  to  significantly 
increase  the  pool of trained personnel;  and  supporl  for  efforts  leading  to 
accelerated technology transition. 
The  High Performance Computing and High Speed Networking Applications Act of 
1993 (HR. 1757) has incorporated a new program into the HPCC by adding a.fifth 
component  to  the  program  for  FY 1994  and  by  putting  more  emphasis  on 
applications  throughout  the  program.  This  new  component,  Information 
Infrastructure  Technology  and Applications  (/ITA),  will  develop  and apply high 
performance computing and communications technologies to  improve  information 
systems needed to address what are called "National Challenges" - major societal 
needs that computing and communicatiC!ns  technology can  help us  address- and 
include  design  and  manufacturing,  health  care,  education,  digital  libraries, 
environmental monitoring,  energy demand management, public safety and national 
security.  These  National  Challenges  are  analogous  to  the  "Grand  Challenge" 
research problems which  have  been the  primary focus of  the  HPCC Program to 
date.  1n addirion to addressing these problems, this new component will support the 
development,  with industry, of  the Nil and the development of  the computer, network 
and  database  technology  needed  to  provide  appropriate  privacy  and  security 
protection for users.  · 
Source:  High  performance  computing  and  communication:  toward  a  national 
information infrastructure.  1994 
12 TECHNICAL STANDARDS A_  'liD REQUIREMENTS FOR TERMINALS IN JAPAN 
ANNEX 7 
Technical standards and Technical Requirements for terminal facilities are  based on 
three principles stipulated by the Telecommunications Business Law of 1985: 
1.  Telecommunications circuits facilities  shall  not be damaged or impaired,  nor shall 
functions there of  be impaired. 
2.  Nuisance  shall  not  be  caused  to  other  users  of the  telecommunications  circuit 
facilities. 
3.  The demarcation of responsability between the telecommunications circuit facilities 
established by a Type I telecommunications carrier and terminal facilities connected 
to ~em  by a user shall be clearly stipulated. 
Technical Standards are stipulated by the Regulations concerning Terminal Facilities, etc. 
(Ministerial Ordinance No  31  of 1985). 
Technical  Requirements  are  specified  by  Type  I  telecommunications  carriers  who 
provide their telecommunications circuit facilities  with the approval  of the  Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunications.  They do  not guarantee telecommunications quality and 
functions, or reliability and operability of  terminal equipment. 
Source: Commission's services FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 1!'\ JAPAN 
ANNEX8 
Japan  accounts  for  16%  of the  world's  GNP,  but  has  attracted  only  about  1%  of the 
world's  cwnulative  inbound  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  since  1970.  Cumulative 
outbound  investment  by  Japan  since  1950  is  $ 352.4  billion,  while  cumulative  direct 
investment by  foreign  firms  in  Japan is  $ 22.8 billion.  Foreign firms  now account for 
less than 2% of  Japan's domestic sales and assets, compared to 15% for the U.S., 18% for 
Germany, and 26% each for France and Canada 2. 
Japan's massive investments in the United States are boosting Japanese exports of parts 
and machinery, just as  the huge investments in Europe by  American companies in the 
1960's promoted, and are  still  promoting, US exports to Europe.  A key element of the 
new  global  economy  is  that  a  staggedng  amount  of trade  is  now  conducted  within 
multinational companies.  More and more trade consists of parts and components that are 
shuttled around the globe as every stage of production is moved to the most economically 
efficient area. 
One  of the  reasons  the  US-European  trade  relationship  is  so  much  more  stable  and 
uncontentious  than  the  US-Japanese  or the  European-Japanese  is  the  vast  amount of 
trans-Atlantic  i-nvestment  in  both  directions.  If the  US-Japanese  or  the  European-
Japanese  investment could  be  brought into  greater balance,  it  would  have  a  similarly 
beneficial  effect  on  trade  relations.  According  to  Eurostat  the  trend  is  leading 
downwards as the  flow of funds  to  Japan which amounted to  MECU 667  in  1989 and 
MECU 914 in  1990 has actually fallen to MECU 363 in 1991. 
2  United-States - Japan  Trade  White  Paper  1993  by  the  American  Chamber of Commerce  in  Japan 
(ACCJ) 
14 JAPANESE LAW ON THE CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAl COMMERCE AND TRA!"'SACTIONS I 
ANNEX 9 
Article 26 reads in particular as follows: 
"3.  Any  foreign  investor  who  wants  to  make  a  din:ct  domestic  investment,  etc., 
mentioned  in  any  Item  of  the  preceding  Paragraph  (except  for  those  cases 
determined by a  Cabinet Order,  in consideration of such  mstances as  inheritance, 
legacy, amalgamation of  juridical persons, etc.) shall give a prior notice, as a Cabinet 
Order provides for,  to the Minister of Finance and the Minister(s) in charge of the 
industry involved of those matters as designated by  the Cabinet Order such as the 
objective of the  business,  amount, time of execution,  and  others  concerning  that 
direct domestic investment, etc. 
4.  Any foreign investor who has given a  notice under the provisions of the preceding 
Paragraph concerning the direct domestic investment, etc., mentioned in Paragraph 2 
(hereinafter referred to  as "direct domestic investment, etc.,") shall  not execute that 
direct  domestic  investment,  etc.,  until  a  period  of thirty  (30)  days  has  elapsed, 
counting from the day of receipt of the notice by  the Minister of Finance and the 
Minister(s) in charge of the industry involved.  However, tht.:  Ministers may shorten 
this period when they deem it not specifically harn1ful, judgmg from  the objective of 
the business, etc., of  the direct domestic investment, etc., unJer notice. 
5.  Any  person  other  than  a  foreign  investor  (including  a  juridical  person  or other 
organization,  which  shall  also  apply  to  Paragraph  I  of the  next  Article)  who 
performs any transaction or act tantamount to a direct domt.:stic  investment, etc., on 
behalf of  a  foreign investor but not in the latter's name shall bt.:  dcemed as a foreign 
investor, and the provisions of the preceding two  Paragraphs shall  apply to  such a 
person." 
The following text is taken from the "Gist of Bill  for  Partial Amendment of the Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law". 
"When the Minister of Finance and  the  Minister(s)  in  charge ul the  industry  involved 
deem  that  a  given  direct  domestic  investment,  etc.,  under  notict.:  would  cause 
apprehensions as to  the occurrence of any of the consequence!-- m_entioncd  in  (i) or (ii} 
below, or that it falls under (iii) or (iv) below, they may, upon hearing the opinion of the 
Committee on Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions and within a specified period, 
recommend or direct the one who gave that notice either to altt.:r the parttculars thereof, or 
to suspend the execution thereof. (Article 27) 
(i)  It might imperil the national  security, disturb the  maintcnance of public  order,  or 
hamper the protection of the safety ofthe general public: 
.  (ii)  It might adversely and seriously affect activities ot our business enterprises engaging 
in a line of business similar to the one in  which the direct domestic tm-cstrm:nt, etc. 
is to be made, or the smooth performance of our national eclll10III). 
(iii)  Because it  is  made by  a  foreign  investor  \\itlt  whose  country  no  trcJttc\ ur  other 
international agreements are concluded by our country  in  te)!ard  t.1  Uirc·d  durrH:stic 
1) investments, etc., its particulars are required to be altered, or its execution is required 
to be suspended, so as to make conditions substantially equal to those allowed to our 
national's similar investment activities in that country; or 
(iv)  When seen from its purpose of the use of  funds and others, it falls under, in whole or 
in  part,  the  capital  transactions  upon  which  an  obligation  to  obtain  a  license  is 
imposed, and therefore its particulars are required to  be altered, or its execution is 
required to be suspended. 
Special provisions concerning acquisition of  stock of  listed companies, etc. : 
(a)  For the time being, when the Minister of  Finance and the Minister(s) in charge of  the 
industry  involved  deem  it  necessary  to  make  an  inquiry  in  order  to  detennine 
whether or not apprehensions as to the occurrence of  any consequences mentioned in 
(i) or (ii) above might ensue from  the acquisition by a non-resident, etc., of stock, 
etc.,  in excess of a certain quantity of listed companies, etc.,  they  may  designate 
certain  companies  which  issue  such  stock,  etc.  (Article  2,  Paragraph  1  of 
Supplementary Provisions). 
(b)  Any non-resident, etc., who is to acquire stock, etc., in excess of a certain quantity of 
a designated company shall give a prior notice to  the  Minister of Finance and the 
Minister(s)  in  charge  of  the  industry  involved.  (Article  3,  Paragraph  I  of 
Supplementary Provisions) 
(c)  When the Minister of Finance and the Minister(s) in charge of the industry involved 
deem that given acquistion of stock, etc., in excess of a certain quantity under notice 
would  cause  apprehensions  as  to  the  occurrence  of any  of the  consequences 
mentioned in (i) or (ii) above, they may, upon hearing the opinion of the Committee 
on  Foreign  Exchange  and  Other  Transactions  and  within  a  specified  period, 
recommend or direct the  one who gave that notice to  suspend such acquisitions in 
whole  or  in  part.  (Article  3,  Paragraph  3,  Paragraph  5,  and  Paragraph  6  of 
Supplementary Provisions). 
Source: Foreign exchange and foreign trade control law. 
16 TYPES OF CARRIERS IN .JAPA,..;  _j 
L-------------------- ------------
ANNEXlO 
No distinction between telecommunications carriers based on facilities ownership exists 
in the Community.  The Council Directive of 28  June  1990 on the  establishment of the 
Internal  Market  for  telecommunications  services  through  the  implementation  of open 
network  provisions  concerns  the  harmonisation  of conditions  for  open  and  efficient 
access to and use of public telecommunications networks and,  where applicable, public 
telecommunications  services 3.  Under  this  Directive  Open  Network  Provisions, 
concerning areas selected in accordance with the list in  annex I of this Directive "must 
not restrict access to public telecommunications networks or public telecommunications 
services, except for  reasons  based on essential  requirements,  within  the  framework of 
Community law, namely, 
security of  network operations, 
maintenance of  network integrity, 
interoperability of  services, in justified case::,, 
protection of  data, as appropriate. 
In addition, the conditions generally applicable to the connection of terminal equipment 
to the network shall apply. 
Open network provision conditions may not allow for any additional restrictions on the 
use  of  the  public  telecommunications  networks  and/or  public  telecommunications 
services except the  restrictions  which  may  be  derived  from  the  exercise of special  or 
exclusive rights granted by  Member States and which are  compatible with Community 
law." 
Equal footing for both types of carriers, who do serve third parties, should be established 
to include: 
equal access  to  type  I  networks  for  type  II  carriers  including  access  at  the  same 
carrier's rate and under equal terms and conditions. 
realisation of an open network architecture  policy  that  provides  for  the  release of 
information regarding interconnects and technical requirements for the development 
of new services,  and  which  ensures  that  type  II  carriers  will  have  access  to  the 
network  capabilities  required  to  provide  the  enhanced  services  that  customers 
demand. 
3  UJ  L  19211  dated 24  7 90 
17 RESTRICTIONS FOR FOREIGN COMPANIES IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN USA 
ANNEX 11 
Restrictions for foreign companies generally in the US are the following: 
i)  Licences  for  any  service  may  not  be  granted  to  companies  owned  by  foreign 
governments (Sec 31 O(a)). 
ii)  Licences for broadcast. common carrier or aeronautical services may not be granted 
to foreigners or foreign corporations; that is to say, a foreign business or individual 
cannot, by itself, receive a licence from the FCC (Section 31 0 (b) (I) and (2)). 
iii)  Licences for broadcast. common carrier or aeronautical services WI be granted to 
companies so long as they do not have foreign officers or directors or are not more 
than 20% owned by foreigners (or 25% indirectly) Sec 310 (b) (3) and (4)). 
iv)  Any foreign-owned  carrier which provides international services  is  classified as a 
"dominant carrier" and regulated accordingiy, i.e.  subjected to  "full" as opposed to 
"streamlined" regulatory treatment depending on whether" ... a relationship between 
a US international carrier and a foreign carrier may present some substantial risk of 
anti-competitive conduct ... ".  (FCC Report and Order, 6 November 1992). 
The newly articulated FCC policy shifts the focus of  competition analysis from whether a 
given operator is  US  or non-US  owned, and  toward a focus  on affiliated relationships 
which may exist between specific US and non-US based operators.  Accordingly, under 
its new policy, FCC will  " .... regulate a US international carrier, whether US or foreign-
owned, as dominant only on those routes where a foreign affiliate of the carrier has the 
ability to discriminate in favor of its US affiliate in the provision of services or facilities 
used to terminate US international traffic. 
A key issue which faced  FCC in arriving at this policy was an appropriate definition of 
"affiliation".  The FCC decided to treat" ... a US carrier as an affiliate of  a foreign carrier 
when the US carrier controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with a foreign 
carrier."  For the purpose of  applying this rule, it elected to adopt a legal test for "control" 
which results in a case-by-case analysis. 
The new FCC policy on international common carriers appears to move in a progressive 
direction because it abolishes the presumption of "non-dominance" on the part of most 
US  operators and  the  presumption  of "dominance" on  the  part .of all  non-US  owned 
operators.  However, it must not be overlooked that, as the FCC was itself careful to note 
in a footnote to the November 6 Report and Order : 
IS "The scope of this Order is limited to addressing  the question of how to  regulate US 
common carriers with foreign affiliations once they have been granted entry to the US 
market.  The Order does not address the question of entry standards for foreign-
affiliated entities that apply for authority to operate in the US market. 
These foreign-owned carriers face discriminatory treatment in matters pertaining to the 
construction of  lines, tariffs and traffic and revenue reports as follows: 
Section 214 of the  Communications Act  requires  common carriers  to  seek  FCC 
authorisation to construct new lines or extend existing lines.  The FCC currently 
forebears regulation for domestic services; but for international services, "dominant" 
carriers  must  obtain  authorisation  for  the  construction  and  extension  of lines; 
authorisation  is  required  for  each  type  of service,  and  each  country;  "non-
dominant" carriers must only get authorisation for the construction of new 
lines. 
All carriers must file tariffs at the FCC for international services; however: 
"dominant" carriers must file most tariffs at the FCC on a 45  days' notice instead of 
14 days for "non-dominant" carriers; 
"non-dominant" carriers' tariffs enter automatically into effect at the end of 14 days 
unless  found  unlawful,  whereas  dominant  carriers'  tariffs  must  obtain  a  positive 
authorisation; 
"dominant" carriers must also submit their costs to justify any tariff changes. 
All carriers must file annual international traffic and revenue reports; but only foreign-
owned "dominant" carriers must file annual domestic traffic and revenue reports. 
Regarding  Section  214  authorisation,  this  requires  that  common  carriers  may  not 
construct, extend or acquire a communications line unless the FCC determines it would 
be in the public interest.  The legislative intent behind this section of the Act  was to 
regulate monopoly providers of communication services, and to  make sure that they did 
not duplicate facilities, which would lead to the monopoly's "captive" customers paying 
higher  charges  than  they  should  for  surplus  facilities.  However,  there  are  no  set 
criteria used by the FCC in order to judge whether it is  in  the present or future 
public convenience that carriers provide services, and there is  some concern that the 
FCC, through its application of  Section 214, is beginning to move away from the original 
intent of the section and to independently make decisions affecting  international  trade 
policy. For example, the FCC in its Further Notice ofProposed Rulemaking (May 1991), 
on international accounting rates, sought comments on whether to condition Section 214 
authorisations  to  ensure  non-discriminatory  treatment of US  carriers  serving  a  given 
country 4• 
4  Report on United States Trade and lmcstment Barriers ( 1993) by Services of the Commiss1on of the European 
Communities- page 73 
l9 Finally,  the  Cable  Landing  Act  requires  a  common  carrier  to  seek  a  (marine)  cable 
landing licence from  the  Secretary of State.  This authority  has  been  delegated  to the 
FCC.  The Act requires consideration of  reciprocity. 
20 US RESTRICTIONS ON MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND T AK£0VERS 
ANNEX 12 
In determining whether a transaction threatens to impair national security, the  President 
is to consider, among other factors:  domestic production  needed  for  projected national 
defense requirements; the capability and capacity of  domestic industries to meet national 
defense requirements; and the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by 
foreign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the 
requirements of  national security. 
Should the President decide that any such transactions threaten national security, he may 
take action to suspend or prohibit them.  This could include the  forced  divestment of 
assets.  There are no  provisions for judicial review or for compensation in the case of 
divestment. 
Thus far in only one out of  a total of  677 transactions reviewed, has the President blocked 
or reversed  an acquistion  - that one  instance  being  the  purchase  of an aircraft  parts 
manufacturered by an arm of  the aerospace ministry of  the People's Republic of China. 
A nwnber of  bills intended to extend the scope of  Exon-Florio provisions, or to widen the 
concept of national security to purely economic matters, have been tabled in  Congress. 
The  Fiscal  Year  1993  Defense  Authorisation  Act  has  strengthened  Exon-Florio 
procedures, by requiring a report by the President to the Congress on the results of each 
CFIUS investigation and by including among other factors to be considered "the potential 
effect  of the  proposed  or  pending  transaction  on  US's  international  technological 
leadership in areas affecting US national security".  This economic criterion is new. 
Moreover,  there  are  three  new  provisions  concerning  entities  controlled  by  foreign 
governments.  This first requires that, if they engage in any merger, acquisition or take-
over which could result in a control that could affect the national security of the  US, an 
Exon-Florio  investigation  be  made.  The  other  two,  although  not  substantially 
burdensome, constitute a declaration of  policy aimed at discouraging acquisitions by (and 
certain contract awards to) such entities. 
According to  the  provisions of the  International  Investment and  Trade in  Services Act 
(IITSSA), all  foreign investments in  US  business enterprises in  which a foreign  person 
owns a 10% or more voting interest (or the equivalent) are subject to reporting. 
Many  States  impose  reporting  requirements  for  investments  by  foreign  individuals, 
foreign-controlled  and  foreign-incorporated  corporations.  Some  States  distinguish 
between reporting  requirements  imposed on foreign  individuals and  those  imposed on 
foreign business entities.  Also, some states treat differently aliens, aliens who have not 
declared their intention to become a US citizen and alien corporations.  Most states with 
reporting  requirements  impose  penalties  for  noncompliance  with  the  reporting 
requirements. 
The ultimate  rationale for  these  restrictions  is  the  argument  that  US  control  of 
communications is essential at all times, for reasons of national securit)·. 
21 Comments/Estinuzted Impact 
While the European Community understands the wishes of  the  United States to take all 
necessary steps to  safeguard its  national security,  there  is  concern  that  the  scope of 
application  may  be  carried beyond  what  is  necessary  to  protect  essential  security 
interests.  In  this  context,  the  Community  has  highlighted  in  comments  to  the  US 
Administration the  wide scope of  the statute,  the lack of  definition of  national security 
and the uncertainty as to which transactions are notifiable.  Although the  US Treasury's 
implementing regulations,  which  were published in November  /991,  do  provide some 
additional guidance on certain issues, these uncertainties remain.  Coupled with the fear 
of  potential forced divestment, they have meant in practice that many, if  not most, foreign 
investors have felt obliged to give prior notification of  their proposed investments.  In 
effect,  a very significant number of  EC firms' acquisitions in the  US  will be subject to 
pre-screening. 
The  Exon-Fiorio provisions could inhibit the efforts of  OECD members to  improve the 
free flow of  foreign investment and could conflict with the principles of  the OECD Code 
of  Liberalisation of  Capital Movements.- .Such an approach  would also harm common 
EC-US efforts to establish multilateral disciplines on trade-related investment measures 
in  the  Uruguay  Round negotiations and to  strengthen the  OECD  National  Treatment 
Instrument. 
Source: Report on United States Trade and Investment Barriers, 1993 by Commission's 
services, page 82 
22 ANNEX 13 
COMPARISON OF CURRENT ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PROGRAI\1 
LANGUAGE WITH MANTON AMENDMENT ADOPTED BY HOUSE 
IS  USC  278n.  Advanced  Technology  Program  ...  (d) 
Contracts or awards; criteria; restrictions ... 
(9)  A  company  shall  be  eligible  to  receive  financial 
assistance: under this section only if ... 
(A) the Secretary finds that the company's participation in 
the Pro&ram would be in the economic interest of  the United 
Sta1es, as evidenced by investments in the United States in 
research,  development,  and  manufacturing  (including,  for 
example,  the  manufacture  of  major  components  or 
subassemblies  in  the  United  States);  significant 
contributions  to  employment  in  the  United  States;  and 
qreement  with  respect  to  any  technology  arising  from 
assistance:  provided  under  this  section  to  promote  the 
manufacture within the United Sta1es of products resulting 
from  that  technology  (taking  into  account  the  goals  of 
promoting the competitiveness of United  States  industry), 
and  to  procure  parts  and  materials  from  competiti\'e 
suppliers; and 
(B) either· 
(i) the company is a United States-owned company, or 
(ii)  the  Secretary  finds  that  the  company  is 
incorporated in the United States and has 1  parent company 
which is  incorporated in  a country which affords to United 
States-owned companies opponunities, comparable to  those 
afforded to  any other company, to  panicipate in  any joint 
venture  similar  to  those · authorized  under  this  chapter. 
affords adequate and effective protection for the intellectual 
property rights of United States-owned companies. 
The  Manton  amendment  adds  additional  definitions  to-15 
USC 3703. Definitions 
2.., 
J 
"(20)  the  term  'United  States  company'  means  an  enti~ 
which the Secretary finds, based on a demonstration by  such 
enti~-
"(A)  maintains  substantial  employment  in  the  United 
States; 
"(B)  agrees,  with  respect  to  a  technology  arising  from 
assistance  pro\'ided  under  this  Act  or  the  National 
Competitiveness Act of 1993,  to  promote  the  manufacture 
within  the  United  States  of products  resulting  from  that 
technology; 
"(C) agrees to procure parts and materials for such products 
from competitive United States suppliers; and 
"(D) either-
"(i)  is a United States-owned company; or 
"(ii)  is  a  company  incorporated  in  the  United  States 
that has a parent company incorporated in  a country which 
the Secretary finds-
"(1)  affords  to  United  States-owned  companies 
opportunities  comparable  to  those  afforded  to  any  other 
company to  participate  m  programs and to  have  access  to 
resources  and  information  equivalent  to  the  opportunities 
authorized under this  Act  or  the  National  Competitiveness 
Act of 1993 to foreign-owned entities engaged 1n  commerce 
in  the United States; 
"(II)  has  a  standards  development  and  conformi~ 
assessment  process  that  is  open  and  transparent,  and  that 
results  in  standards that arc  fair  and  reasonable and do  not 
discriminate against  United  States products and production 
processes; 
"(Ill)  affords  to  United  States-owned  companies 
local investment opportunities comparable to those afforded 
in any other company; and 
"(IV)  affords  adequate  and  effective  protection  for 
the  intellectual  property  rights  of  United  States-owned 
companies; 
"(21) the term 'United States manufacturer" means a  United 
States  company  which  the  Secretary  fmds,  based  on  a 
demonstration  by  such  company,  makes  substantial 
in' estments  in  the  United  States  in  research. development. 
and  manufacturing  (including  the  manufacture  of  major 
components or subassemblies in  the United States), 
"(22)  the  term  'United  States-owned  company'  has  the 
meaning given such term  in  section 28(j)(2) of the  National 
Institute  of  Standards  and  Technology  Act  ( 15  U.S C 
278n(j)(2))," THE US SPACE INDUSTRY 
ANNEX 14 
The US space industry had an annual revenue of  approximately $ 22 billion in 1991, ten 
times  greater  than  that  of Europe's  industry.  As  shown  below,  $ 21  billion  of US 
expenditure (95%) is by the government compared to just$ 1.5 billion (70%) collectively 
by Europe's governments. 
us  SPACE  EUR  SPACE 
INDUSTRY  INDUSTRY 
BNECU  %total  BNECU  %Total  Europe % of  US 
Total sales  26.00  100  2.50  100  9.60 
Government 
.. 
24.70  95  1.75  70  7.10 
Markets 
-Military  13.85  53  0.25  10  1.80 
-Civilian  10.85  42  I.SO  60  13.80 
Commercial  1.30  5  0.75  30  57.70 
(Exchange rate : I ECU =  $ 1.166) 
Sources : Aerospace Industries Association, Euroconsult, CEC 
The high  level  of US  government expenditure provides  a very  significant commercial 
advantage  to  US  satellite  manufacturers  over  European  manufacturers.  Government 
markets  are  effectively  closed  to  non-domestic  providers.  This  large  captive  market 
provides US satellite manufacturers  with sufficient  revenue  and  production  volume to 
avail of: 
economies of  scale in production, procurement, staffing, research and development, 
opportunities to cross-subsidise eg. sales to the commercial market, 
market credibility and image. 
Although European organisations may  establis~ or buy US defense subsidiaries, to  mee~ 
national security requirements they must be staffed by US citizens making direct control 
of a  subsidiary  more  difficult.  Also,  the  onus  is  on the  US  purchaser .to  justify to 
government that they are buying from foreign suppliers for every purchase undertaken. 
This entails that the only way to  compete in the US satellite market is  as a member 
of a US-led consortium. 
European investment in the US to date has been limited.  In addition to establishing some 
US  subsidiaries  to  target the equipment and  private  service markets  mainly,  European 
companies have invested recently in US-led consortia (eg. Orion) to provide international 
mobile satellite services.  This reflects the US regulatory barriers but also the desire of  US 
·24 companies to  spread the  high capital costs involved,  and  their  wish  to  have  European 
partners in order to facilitate entry to the European market. 
US builders of  commercial communications satellites have reasserted their dominance in 
world markets after losing ground in the  1980's, slowing the  advance of European and 
Asian manufacturers.  According to the most recent multi-client study, by  Euroconsult, 
Hughes Space and Communications Company and General Electricity have pulled away 
from the rest of  the competition and appear likely to pace the market in the 1990's. 
The study throws into sharp relief the fact that the United States continues to make space 
a higher priority for government spending than any other nation. 
U.S. spending for both military and civilian space programs, which in  1992 topped $35 
billion,  is  equivalent to  0.6%  of the  American  gross  domestic  product.  60%  of that 
spending is on behalf of  the U.S. Defense Department. 
The 12 nations of the European Community spend a combined 0.05% of these nations' 
domestic economic output- one-twelfth of  the American level.  Even in France, which is 
Europe's biggest space power and has a thriving civil and military space program, spends 
less than 0.2% of  its gross domestic product on space. 
The contrast remains striking  no  matter how the  figures  are  sliced:  The  United  States 
spends nearly 2.4% of its federal  government budget on space,  both civil and military; 
France spends less than 0.4%, with the rest of  Europe and Japan at much lower levels. 
These figures do not include spending in Russia, which is nearly impossible to assess on 
Western  terms.  While  impenetrable  accounting  practises  may  camouflage  Russian 
military space spending, the study says investment in these systems in  Russia "is visibly 
decreasing faster than the civilian budget." 
Euroconsult's annual report gives the  impression that  Europe's  space spending effort in 
the  1980s did little to  undermine the United States' leadership.  The  13-nation European 
Space  Agency  more  than  quadrupled  its  spending  between  1981  and  1992,  but  U.S. 
industry remains "clearly dominant," the study concludes. 
U.S.  companies  have  won  slightly  more  than  73%  of the  worldwide  market  in  civil 
communications satellites in geostationary orbit set  for  launch between  1990  and  1996. 
Europe has 25% of  the market. 
The total market for these satellites thus far is  125 spacecraft launched or firmly ordered, 
with a market value of  $10.4 billion in 1992 economic conditions. 
Two years ago, Euroconsult's figures  suggested that  U.S.  companies would continue to 
lose market share to the Europeans in the early 1990s, just as they had in the early 1980s.· 
However, a  series of hotly contested  battles since  1990  in  Japan,  the  Middle  East  and 
elsewhere, won by Hughes and GE Astro Space against European competition, appears to 
have reversed the trend. 
The American advantage is occurring despite a drift of satellite concentration away from 
North America and toward Europe, Asia and elsewhere. 
-25-Euroconsult  reports  that one-third of the  communications satellites  made  in  the  1980s 
were for the  U.S.market.  That will  slip to  less  than a quarter between  1992 and  2003, 
meaning that U.S.  satellite builders will  be doing more and  more business for  non-U.S. 
customers. 
United  States  continues  to  dominate  Satellite  Manufacturing  despite  increased 
competition, U.S. market share projected to grow in the 90's. 
1972-79  1980-89  1990-96* 
Number of  satellites  37  99  125 
Market value in billions  2  6.39  10.40 
of 1992 dollars 
UNITED STATES  100%  69.7%  72.3% 
Hughes Aircraft  87.1%  27.7%  30.0% 
General Electric  12.9%  16.8%  26.6% 
Space systems/Lora!  0.0%  18.9%  9.9% 
TRW  0.0%  6.3%  4.3% 
Fairchild  0.0%  0.0%  1.0% 
CTA  0.0%  0.0%  0.5% 
EUROPE  0.0%  23.5%  25.1% 
Matra  0.0%  4.4%  9.8% 
Aerospatiale  0.0%  5.2%  8.2% 
British Aerospace  0.0%  8.2%  3.3% 
Alenia  0.0%  0.9%  2.5% 
Deutsche Aerospace  0.0%  4.8%  1.3% 
CANADA  0.0%  3.8%  1.4% 
JAPAJii  0.0%  3.0%  1.2% 
•  Includes firm contracts for future launches 
Source: barriers to European industry trading in the US  satellite communications market. 
A study by KPMG, January 1993 
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MARKET SHARES 1993 
Workstations 
Market Share  Europe  us  Japan  ROW  WWidc 
In 
Vendors 
European  2.3%  0.7% 
Vendors 
US Vebdors  7%  98.8%  59.80%  89.4% 
Japanese  0.0%  40.2%  9.4% 
Vendors 
Other  1.2%  0.5% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  "100.0% 
Personal Computers 
Market Share  Europe  us  Japan  ROW  WWide 
In 
Vendors  1993 
European  32.2%  2.5%  0.0%  1.8%  11.4% 
Vendors 
US Vendors  56.5%  85.7.%  22.8%  45.1%  633% 
Japanese  3.6%  7.6%  77.3%  3.5%  13.2%  . 
Vendors  .. 
Other  7.7%  4.2%  0.1%  49.6%  12.1% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Source: International Data Corporatton 
-27-Personal computers 
Market share figures for personal computer manufacturers are collated by IDC in the US 
at London in the Personal Computer European Expertise Centre and  for  the  EDP  IDC 
Japan Reporting Service. 
The  single-user  market  (  eg  PCs,  workstations,  printers,  add-on  storage  such  as  CO-
ROMs) is particularly strong at the· moment, driven by decreasing prices, improving chip 
technology (primarly the Intel 80486) and the Windows interface to the DOS operating 
system.  In  1993,  IDC's  preliminary  figure  for  sales  were  36.260.00  units,  up  from 
30.376.000 in 1992 (190.4 growth). 
Dominant players in each market are: 
Europe  USA  Japan 
IBM  Apple  Nec(46.2%) 
Compacq  IBM  Apple 
Apple  Compacq  IBM 
Olivetti  HP  Fujistsu 
Hewlett-Packard  Dell  Epson 
Worldwide, Compaq has increased its market share from 5.1% of the market to 8.5%, as 
its worldwide sales increased 98%.  Of  the two major European suppliers, ZDS (i.e. Bull) 
has  increased sales 62%  whereas  Olivetti  has put  in a growth  rate  of 15%,  below the 
industry average (but not  surprising as  the  company  operates  mostly  in  Europe which 
suffered widespread economic recession in 1993). 
Europe 
Mar/ret size: 10.604.000 units, $19.310 million 
Olivetti has targeted the PC market in recent years and  is  now the iargest Europe-base 
supplier.  The company's offering  tend  to  be  lower cost machines  than  the other four 
companies in the top five.  Its unit market share being higher than its vatue market share 
whereas for IBM, Compaq, Apple and HP the opposite is the case.  However, ·siemens, 
Nixdorf (SNI) has recently made clear that it intends to target the PC market in the future. 
Digital,  one  of the  poorest  performing  IT companies at  present,  has  also  signalled  its 
intention to target the PC market more ferociously than in the past.  · 
The  most  recent development (announced  in  the  last two  weeks)  has  been  the  intense 
price war breaking out between Compaq and  IBM as they attempt to shift boxes. · Price 
cuts of 20  - 30% price have been  announced,  in  part  to  cut stock levels  before  future 
launches.  IBM  is  suffering  particularly  from  having  excess  supplies  of its  low-end 
machines but a shortage of  its nex Power PCs. 
-28-USA 
At present, only unit values for the US market are available.  The most noticeable feature 
of the US market is the strong growth of three companies - Compaq, Hewlett-Packard's 
PC ann -Packard Bell and AST.  IBM is still growing but market share is declining. 
The only European supplier with a strong US presence is Bull.  Bull's PC  arm - Zenith 
Data Systems (ZDS) - has  been the saviour of Groupe Bull  in  recent months.  Large 
revenue increases for Groupe Bull have almost all  been derived from  the exceptionally 
strong performance of  ZDS. 
In both the US and Europe, Japanese strength is in the notebook market where Toshiba is 
particularly strong. 
Japan 
The Japanese market continues to be dominated by NEC (46% of the market by value, 
49% by unit).  However, Apple has a _1_3.4% market share and IBM 6.4%.  No European 
players are particularly active in Japan (ICL is defmed by IDC as a European supplier in 
Europe although Fujitsu has a majority stake in the company). 
The second rank of US vendors have almost no presence in Japan, accounting for less 
than I% of  shipments. 
Rest of \\'orld 
The two largest markets in "Rest of World" are Canada and Australia.  Information on 
those markets is collated by Wordwilde PC Research by is  not available until the year 
end, although aggregate information is available (hence worldwide figures). 
Workstations 
Largest suppliers in each market (in descending order of  importance) 
Europe  USA  Japan 
Sun  Sun  Sun 
HP  HP  Yokogawa HP 
Digital  Digital  Fujitsu 
IBM  SGI  NEC 
SGI  IBM·  Hitachi 
Sun continues to dominate the worskstation market with 37.8% of the worldwide market.. 
However,  Hewlett-Packard  is  also  a  strong  performer  with  nearly  20% of worldwide 
sales.  IDC expects the two companies leading the market in  1994 with Silicon Graphics 
-29-moving into third position within the traditional  workstation  segment as  IBM focuses 
more on personal workstations and servers and Digital continues rough times. 
In 1993 a new category of  system was being created from the upward push of  PCs and the 
downward push of workstations.  IDC has labelled this category of system the personal 
workstation.  Sun accounts  for  the majority of sales  at  present  (e.g.  60% in  Europe) 
following the launch of  low cost SparcStations (now under $3000). 
Europe 
Hewlett-Packard  is  perfonning  particularly  well  at  present  in  Europe.  While  Sun 
continues to dominate the worldwide market, in Europe the company only leads HP by 
3.5%. 
USA 
Hewlett-Packard  is  expected  to  experience  continued  strong  growth  as  it  has  neared 
completion  of  its  transition  from  Motorola-based  workstations  to  PA-RISC-based 
workstations. 
Tatung, the Taiwanese finn, sold 3000 units in the US  in 1993, accounting for the small 
proportion of  sales outside Europe/Japan/US suppliers. 
Japan 
Growth of I 0.6% in the  Japanese market  in  1993  was  driven  by  an  accelerated shift 
towards  downsizing  from  mainframes  and  proprietary  minicomputers  to  Unix 
workstations and servers.  This trend is causing the  focus of the workstation market to 
migrate  from  traditional  scientific  and  engineering  applications  to  commercial 
applications. 
The US suppliers are working in counjunction with  Japanese companies, hence Nihon 
Sun Microsystems and  Yokogawa-Hewlen-Packard.  IDC  Japan  forecast  almost  20% 
growth in the Japanese workstation market in 1994. 
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